

CHAPTER II

SECTION 2

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

MS/HC 916

HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENTAL PERIOD

18 September 1947 - 1 July 1951

SECTION 2

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

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HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS  
THE DEVELOPMENTAL PERIOD

SECTION 2  
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Table of Contents

	<u>Page Number</u>
A. GENERAL. . . . .	1
B. OPC ESTABLISHED. . . . .	5
C. ORGANIZATION STUDIES AND DEVELOPMENT-1948-1951 . . .	10
1. General. . . . .	10
2. Recommendations of <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></span> . . .	20
3. Establishment of the Office of Communications. .	24
D. PERSONNEL. . . . .	25
1. General. . . . .	25
2. Consolidated OSO/OPC Communications T/O. . . . .	31
E. LOGISTICS. . . . .	34
1. Supply and Warehousing . . . . .	34
2. Equipment Stockpiles . . . . .	38
F. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY. . . . .	41
1. Security Branch. . . . .	41
2. Electric Cipher Machines . . . . .	42
3. Radio Monitoring Project . . . . .	43
4. Physical Security Inspections. . . . .	44
5. Cryptographic Control. . . . .	45

	<u>Page Number</u>
G. CABLES AND CIRCUITRY. . . . .	51
1. General . . . . .	51
2. Intelligence Dissemination Network. . . . .	59
3. Department of Defense . . . . .	60
H. TRAINING. . . . .	62
I. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT STAFF . . . . .	70
J. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE. . . . .	75
K. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. . . . .	81
1. General . . . . .	81
2. R&D Within OSO. . . . .	82
3. R&D Within OPC. . . . .	86
L. COMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS. . . . .	88

APPENDIX 2-A Communications Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs

APPENDIX 2-B CIA Regulation [redacted], Communications

APPENDIX 2-C Report on Communications - Central Intelligence Agency [redacted]

APPENDIX 2-D Extracts from CIA Regulation [redacted]

APPENDIX 2-E Memorandum of Agreement on Supply Procedures

APPENDIX 2-F CIA Regulation No. [redacted] Requests for Cryptographic Staff Communications

APPENDIX 2-G CIA Regulation No. [redacted] Staff Cryptocommunications at Field Stations

APPENDIX 2-H Cryptographic Links

APPENDIX 2-I Circuitry and Routing Data

APPENDIX 2-J Assessment of Requirements and Procedures  
for Operations Support

25X1 APPENDIX 2-K S. O. Procedure Guide  (Revised),  
Special Equipment

APPENDIX 2-L Status of Research and Development Projects  
(Three Parts)

APPENDIX 2-M Descriptions of Clandestine Communications  
Equipment

25X1 APPENDIX 2-N

25X1 APPENDIX 2-O OSO Regulation No.  Basic Policy, Field  
Communications

25X1 APPENDIX 2-P OSO Regulation No.  Assignment of Communi-  
cations Personnel to Clandestine Operations

25X1 APPENDIX 2-Q  Inter-Station  
Communications

APPENDIX 2-R Reference Bibliography

APPENDIX 2-S Index of Persons

APPENDIX 2-T Geographical Index

## History of the Office of Communications The Developmental Period


### Section 2 Organization and Administration

#### A. GENERAL

The activation of CIA resulted in no immediate change in the organizational position of communications support functions. The Communications Division continued to operate in the Office of Special Operations (OSO), as an element under Administration and Services (CAS), which in May 1948 was designated Administration and Services Group. Responsibilities were as established at the time of CIG General Order No. 3 of 18 June 1947 and encompassed the provision of communications support to all components of CIA.

As of 18 September 1947, [ ] and [ ] were Chief and Deputy Chief, Communications Division, respectively. [ ] was Chief, Administration and Services, and [ ] was Assistant Director for Special Operations. The Communications Division was comprised of six components:

Office of the Chief  
Signal Center  
Signal Security Section  
Research and Engineering Section  
Operations Section  
Signal Property Control Section



A listing of Communications Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs during the period 18 September 1947 to 1 July 1951 is presented as Appendix 2-A.

On 1 January 1949, the Communications Division was placed under the direct supervision of the Office of the Assistant Director for Special Operations (ADSO). 1/ This was a result of General Order No. 11 which abolished the Administration and Services Group, OSO, within which Communications was located. Two changes in incumbents of the ADSO position took place about this time. [redacted] was designated

Acting ADSO effective 27 December 1948 and [redacted]

[redacted] was announced as ADSO on 18 March 1949. The next change in ADSO occurred 15 February 1951 when [redacted]

[redacted] relieved [redacted]

In September 1949, CIA adopted the vertical organization structure prescribed for the Federal Government. This changed the title of Communications Division elements from Section to Branch. As of March 1950, the Communications Branches and the incumbent Chiefs were as follows:

Operations Branch

Security Branch  
(Formerly Signal Security)

Engineering Branch

25X1

Training Branch

Signal Center

A Facilities Information Unit had been added to the Operations Branch. This group was responsible for maintaining information on world-wide electrical communications facilities of all types and for preparing reports as requested. Liaison was established with personnel in other agencies and with commercial concerns as sources for obtaining needed data. The information was available on request to personnel within the Communications Division, as well as, to personnel of other Agency Offices, and served as a guiding factor in planning of both overt and covert operations. There were no other significant organizational changes with the Communications Division during 1950.

A new Section within the Communications Division was established effective 20 January 1951, the Communications Mail and Files Section, under the Administrative Staff. 2/ The new Section was responsible for the receipt and distribution of cables, pouches, correspondence, publications, and other communications; their recording, correlation, control; and the maintenance of correspondence files.

Following a period of organization studies, which are discussed later, Communications was changed from a Division to an Office status. Effective 1 July 1951, the Office of Communications



(OC) was established under the Deputy Director, Plans and in a position comparable with the Office of Special Operations, Office of Policy Coordination, and Office of Operations. 3/ The title of the Communications Chief was changed to Assistant Director for Communications.

Upon the establishment of the Office of Communications the following organization was effective:

Assistant Director for  
Communications  
Policy and Planning Staff  
Supplementary Activities  
Staff  
Administrative Staff  
Engineering Division  
Operations Division  
Security Division  
Signal Center

The former Mail and Files Section became Communications "Registry" remaining under the Administrative Staff. The Training Branch became an element of the Operations Division. To enable the continued effective handling of communications matters within OSO, [ ] of the Office of Communications was detailed as Liaison Communications Officer with OSO. He was carried on the OC personnel rolls, but had desk space in OSO so that he could expeditiously advise on communications problems as they arose.

B. OPC ESTABLISHED

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was established effective 1 September 1948 (General Order No. 10, dated 27 August 1948). Mr. Frank G. Wisner was designated Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (ADPC). OPC superseded the Special Procedures Group, which had been in operation within OSO since 1 January 1948.

As the new organization developed, there was an increasing need for a focal point within OPC for channeling communications matters. In early 1949, [ ] was brought into OPC on a contract basis to handle Communications.

[ ] joined OPC in July 1949 as Assistant to [ ]. Upon the departure of [ ] shortly thereafter, [ ] became Signal Officer, OPC. Also during the formative days, [ ] who had been Chief, Communications Division, SSU, was employed by OPC as a Communications consultant. [ ] was not on duty regularly in Washington, but attended meetings and conferences as required.

The Signal Officer was a staff position within OPC, actual implementation of communications support remaining with the Communications Division, OSO. Initially, OPC Communications was under the Executive for Administration and Support, with duties performed by a "Chief, Communications." 4/ Subsequently,

C O N F I D E N T I A L

the communications function came under the Operations Division within an Operations Special Staff. 5/ The term, Signal Officer, was used at this time. An OPC reorganization in 1950 established a Staff II with an Operations Support Branch and a Communications Support Officer. 6/ A later reorganization in 1951 placed the communications function under an Operational Support Branch, Operations Division, Plans and Operations Staff. 7/ The responsibilities of the OPC Communications Officer were as follows:

- a. Assisting in the formulation, development, coordination, and implementation of communications policy and techniques for all elements of OPC.
- b. Coordinating communications support activities between the Communications Division, OSO, and the various Staffs and Divisions of OPC.
- c. Assisting OPC Staffs and Divisions in determining requirements of OPC in communications equipment, personnel, training, and facilities.
- d. Assisting OPC Staffs and Divisions in determining feasibility of projects and operations in the proposal stage.
- e. Representing OPC on the Joint OSO/OPC Communications Board.

25X1 [ ] continued as Signal/Communications  
Officer throughout the time period covered in this Chapter.

25X1 [ ] Special Assistant to the Chief, Com-  
munications Division, OSO, served OPC as Communications Officer  
25X1 for a short period during [ ] absence in Europe on  
temporary duty (May-June 1951).

In connection with OPC's program of psychological war-  
fare, there was need for expert advice in the specialized field  
of radio broadcasts. In addition, it was considered desirable  
to provide increased assistance to the Communications Division,  
OSO, in the development of the world-wide communications plan  
as it concerned OPC. To meet these requirements, [ ]

25X1 [ ] former OSS Chief for Europe, was employed as a con-  
25X1 sultant to the Chief, Communications Division. 8/ He was  
detailed to OPC with the specific assignment of assisting OPC  
in the planning and implementation of the OPC Communications  
program and assisting the Chief, Communications Division, in  
communications matters pertaining to the special type operations  
for which OPC was responsible. [ ] was made available  
25X1 to CIA [ ] where he was regularly  
25X1 employed. 9/ He reported in the consultant capacity in October  
1950 and served for about three months.

A discussion of communications support for OPC Divisions  
was contained in a memorandum of 5 December 1950 from the

[redacted] While dealing directly with [redacted] matters, it comprised a basic statement of the communications support relationship between OPC and OSO. 10/ Chief, Staff II, confirmed that in accordance with OPC regulations, the OPC Communications Officer (II/SA/CM) was responsible for assisting the Foreign Divisions in obtaining adequate and proper communications support of all projects requiring such support. He outlined the following pertinent points:

a. The responsibility for proper implementation of requested communications support was that of the Communications Division, OSO. This included the scheduling and provision of equipment, scheduling and provision of communications training and instructors, and the provision of adequate communications planning to support all OPC projects. This responsibility of the Communications Division could be discharged only when requirements were forwarded by OPC.

b. It was the responsibility of the OPC Communications Officer to advise and assist OPC Foreign Divisions in determining, evaluating, and stating their communications requirements, and to advise and assist the Communications Division, OSO, in interpreting the requirements.

c. The timely solution of communications problems arising from OPC projects could be insured only by the Chief, Communications Division, and then only when sufficient information and times were available for the solution to be devised and implemented.

d. The staff capacity of the Communications Office of OPC did not allow designation as case officer on Foreign Division projects, but that Office could properly serve as technical consultant to project case officers in order that they might discharge their responsibilities on communications support problems efficiently and effectively.

e. The OPC Communications Officer would continue to conduct liaison between  (and other Foreign Divisions) and the Communications Division, OSO, and render every other service possible.

25X1

From the outset of OPC's establishment, difficulties in communications support were encountered because of inadequate coordination between the originators of operational projects and Communications personnel while projects were in the planning stages. Failure of the operational planners to make known their requirements to the OPC Communications Officer in the early

stages resulted in communications needs often reaching the Communications Division after projects were approved and prior to any consideration of the feasibility of meeting the requirements or the established deadlines. Steps were taken in February 1951 to correct this deficiency. The requirement was then established for every OPC project presentation which called for communications support to include a communications annex prepared by the case officer with the assistance of the OPC Communications Officer and the Communications Division, OSO. The ADPC, in announcing the new procedures, stated that no projects would be approved unless a communications annex was attached to the project outline at the time it was submitted for approval. The annex was to describe the communications problems involved, recommendations on the personnel, equipment, and facilities necessary, and a statement on availability, cost, and time factors. 11/ The new requirements corrected the previous confusion in communications coordination and provided a basis for intelligent planning within the Communications Division in anticipation of project approval.

C. ORGANIZATION STUDIES AND DEVELOPMENT - 1948-1951

1. General

In July 1948, the DCI directed that a study be made of the existing CIA organization with the objectives of minimizing

duplication and providing the best method and means for administrative support of the Agency. 12/ One recommendation stemming from this study was a proposal by the Executive for Administration and Management (A&M) that complete administrative support for all of CIA be centralized under A&M, to include the transfer of Communications as a Branch of A&M. 13/

The proposal to centralize support was opposed by the ADSO. It was his view that it would be most unwise to separate the administrative support for covert operations from the control of those who directed operations. 14/ His position was that covert operations and their administrative support should continue under the direct control of the Director (ADSO), and that with two covert offices functioning it would be advisable to have them coordinated by a staff officer with a few assistants who would issue instructions only in the name of the Director. He further proposed that the existing Administration and Services Unit of OSO become the Unit to support the two covert offices under the direction of the operational staff officer of the Director.

During this same period, the Chief of the Communications Division made strong recommendations that this Division remain an integral part of OSO. 15/ His presentation, which was approved by the DCI on 10 September 1948, follows:



"Under the present organization, the Communications Division is under the Chief of Administration and Services, OSO. It provides services to FBIB, Services Branch, A&M, Contacts Branch, and to OPC, and to such other elements in CIA as directed by ADSO.

"In addition to performing these duties, the Communications Division is an integral part of OSO, and approximately 90 percent of its activities have to do with Special Operations. Its present position in South Building is already dangerously separated and removed from operations. Further separation would seriously jeopardize the operations of both the Communications Division and the operating branches.

"The functions of the Communications Division make it an integral operational part of the Special Operations of OSO and consist of devising ciphers, cryptographic procedures, signal plans, equipment design, and providing equipment, cipher training and communications training. All of these functions are done both for the daily routine operations and for the clandestine operations requiring intimate knowledge by the personnel of the Communications Division of all planning and details of operations, including actual acquaintanceship with the personnel involved, including agents. Communications personnel are involved in actual OSO operations of all degrees of security while still remaining assigned to and responsible to the Chief of the Communications Division.

"The Communications Division is the most dangerous security point in all CIA, especially with respect to OSO operations since details of all operations must be centralized in the Communications Division and where both true names and pseudonyms of all personnel, agent or otherwise, must be available and if not made available, can readily or eventually be determined.

"To provide efficient communications to the operating branches, Communications must be included in the planning of operations, the procedures to be used, and the discussions of proposed plans. These are at present and must be a continuing day-to-day practice and go far beyond the limits of liaison. Communications has data on the normal and clandestine operations in all areas which is concentrated in no other place to such an extent. The fact that the Communications Division must have this information makes it imperative that Communications be under the control of that section dealing with clandestine operations for the safety of the personnel involved and the national security. This information cannot be denied to the Communications Division as an agent's information is useless unless he can transmit it to the proper authorities which in time of political stress requires the use of clandestine radio communications. Clandestine radio communications will not produce results unless signal plans and cipher plans have been previously provided to work to a given radio base, which base must be controlled by the same group of people that controls the agent.

"It is, therefore, strongly recommended that the Communications Division remain an integral part of the Office of Special Operations."

The move of the Communications Division's Washington Headquarters from South Building to "L" Building was being planned about the time of the controversial organizational discussions. The ADSO in his comments to the Deputy Director, CIA, concerning the relocation considered it essential that the Communications Division be kept together in one location, and if OSO moved, all of the Communications Division should be moved to the same place at the same time. 16/ The possibility

of dividing the Communications Division elements or physically separating them further from the rest of OSO was seriously opposed. It was pointed out that Operations required close working relationships between Operations Sections of OSO and the Communications Division and between elements of the Division itself. Operations and operational planning were a joint procedure involving the Cipher Control, Operations, Engineering, and Supply Sections of the Communications Division with the respective desks of OSO Operations, consisting of day-to-day conferences and close working contacts. Division of the Signal Center into two separated installations was objectionable from the standpoints of requiring more personnel, making control more difficult, and increasing the chances of traffic delay and compromise.

The Assistant Director for the new Office of Policy Coordination agreed that splitting up communications facilities would entail the risk of transmission delays and security compromise. He considered the relationship of OPC to the Communications Division would be substantially the same as that of OSO, and in any move, it was necessary for OPC to be located physically near the Signal Center. 17/

The basic proposal for the centralization of administrative support was approved and announced by CIA General Order No. 11, 14 September 1948. 18/ This Order removed administrative support

functions from OSO and realigned them under an Executive for Administration. It abolished the OSO Administration and Services Group, including its Personnel Division, Special Funds Division, and Transportation and Supply Division. Effective 1 January 1949, the title, "Executive for Administration", was changed to "Executive, CIA" and this official assumed central control of all CIA administrative support functions and direct responsibility for overall coordination of CIA administration and operations (CIA General Order No. 12, 30 December 1948). In line with the DCI's earlier approval for the Communications Division to remain within OSO, it was not included in the changes. However, with the abolishment of the OSO's Administration and Services Group, within which Communications was located, the Communications Division on 1 January 1949 was placed under the direct supervision of the Office of the ADSO.

The DCI's decision that the Communications Division would remain within OSO stopped further immediate efforts to transfer its organizational location. However, a proposal to place Communications under the overall CIA Administration Office again arose in late 1950. Throughout 1950 and 1951 and particularly in early 1951, considerable attention was being given to studies of CIA's organizational structure. Coordination

and integration of OSO and OPC activities were among subject under active review. Consideration of the proper position for communications within CIA came in for much discussion.

25X1 CIA Regulation [ ] dated 1 November 1950 (Appendix 2-B) defined the Office of Special Operations as the Agency Office solely responsible, except for certain monitoring services carried out by the Foreign Broadcast Information Division (FBID), for establishing, operating, and maintaining all radio and tele-type communications facilities that were the property of or under the control of CIA, and for negotiating in behalf of CIA with other U. S. Government agencies and privately owned companies for the use of their communications facilities.

25X1 CIA Regulation [ ] which established the organization and functions of CIA and its components, was issued on 1 December 1950 and distributed for comments. This Regulation placed the Office of Communications under the Deputy Director for Administration. The ADSO took exception to this on the basis that he considered it neither desirable nor operationally sound. 19/ He made the following case for retaining the Communications Division within OSO:

"Careful consideration has been given to the fact that portions of the Communications Division are not purely operational, e.g., the Signal Center, Engineering, Training and Security Branches. However, control of Communications is considered to be so essential to the effective conduct of secret intelligence operations that only the most compelling

arguments can properly override this consideration.

"The most sensitive and vital espionage and counterespionage operations of OSO require a close and intimate integration with the Communications Division which affords that Division, of necessity, detailed knowledge concerning operations. In addition, the Communications Division is guided and controlled by OSO in matters involving special materials operationally procured exclusively by OSO and supervised by Staff E/OSO. The security factor which results from both of the above facts requires that the Communications Division remain an integral part of OSO. An additional factor making this necessary is the OSO responsibility for the security and counterespionage protection, as well as other support, of communications activities overseas. Actually, in many OSO field installations communications duties are performed by OSO personnel who have other primary OSO responsibilities and upon reassignment would not be assigned to the Communications Division.

"The removal of the Communications Division from OSO could not but impair the security, efficiency and success of the secret intelligence mission."

A study within the Communications Division itself of the proposed Regulation  resulted in certain recommendations by the Division Chief. 20/ His proposals placed Communications in position as a fourth Office under a Deputy Director, Operations, but recommended the title, "Chief, Communications" rather

than "Assistant Director." It was proposed also that a staff communications officer, with suitable assistants, be assigned to each Assistant Director (OSO, OPC, OO) to assure that communications requirements peculiar to each operating office would be effectively presented and provided for. The Chief, Communications Division made the following points relative to his recommendations: 21/

a. Communications was an "operating" rather than "administrative" type support, but must support both operations and administration. The officer responsible for this support should be a part of the operating structure of the Agency and should be able to present his requirements and advice direct to the officer responsible for the overall success of Agency operations.

b. The provision of communications support for several different offices whose requirements were often at variance required official liaison and correspondence channels which were not involved in the execution of policies peculiar to any one office. Offices supported should be in a position to control their own requirements and assure that they were met to the extent of Agency capacity, but should not be involved in the

control of administration and technical operations required to meet their communications needs.

c. The education, experience, and personality qualifications of individuals making up the communications organization were different from those suited for other positions in the covert or overt offices of the Agency. The training, rotation, and promotion policies to assure the best communications personnel should be separate from those of any one CIA office, and communications personnel should not be required to compete with personnel of any particular office either professionally or numerically (percentages of promotion quotas, etc.).

d. The title "Chief, Communications," was recommended regardless of the location of the Communications Office within the Agency organization. This was based on common usage throughout the Government in indicating the senior individual in a Department or Agency's communications organization and was intended to place the head of CIA Communications on an equal basis. A possible intention to compromise or appease other elements was evident in the statement of the Chief, Communications Division, that a title such as Chief, Communications,



"also serves to subordinate somewhat communications to the operational offices it serves, as 'Assistant Director' is generally considered senior to any chief."

25X1 CIA Regulation [ ] was reissued 19 January 1951. This designated the Office of Special Operations (OSO) as one of three offices under the Deputy Director (Plans), the others being the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) and the Office of Operations (OO). Communications remained as an OSO element, at a level comparable with the Training Division (TRD), Budget and Liaison Control (BLC), and the Operational Aids Division (OAD).

25X1 2. Recommendations [ ]

25X1 About this same time, at the request of the DCI, [ ]  
25X1 [ ] made a study to determine (1) the place that communications should be given in the overall Agency organization, and (2) the duties performed by Communications, including consideration of whether these duties should be expanded. [ ] report to the DCI included the following recommendations:

25X1 a. That the Division of Communications be given the title of Office of Communications in order that its Head may have the necessary prestige

to act on a co-equal status with officers charged with similar duties in the Navy, Air Force, Army, and other Government departments.

b. That the Office of Communications be retained under the Deputy Director (Plans).

c. That the Office of Communications be given a co-equal status with that of the Office of Special Operations, Office of Policy Coordination, and Office of Operations.

d. That the Head of the Office of Communications be given the title of Assistant Director for Communications.

e. That the responsibilities of the Office of Communications, particularly with respect to research and development and policy liaison, be enlarged in scope so as to correspond in general with that of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

25X1 The complete  report is presented as Appendix 2-C.

25X1 There was not complete agreement with  conclusions. In particular, while the ADPC agreed that Communications should be retained in the DD/P's area of

jurisdiction, he felt that the Communications Officer's exact title and final organizational location was dependent on ultimate decisions as to how OPC, OSO, and OO were to be more closely integrated. 22/ Under the existing organization, it was the ADPC's opinion that to raise the Communications Officer to the level of Assistant Director would negate the idea that communications must serve operations. He pointed out that a joint study on integration of OSO and OPC had recommended that the Communications Division be placed on the area division level, with the head of the division also serving as the senior technical advisor to DD/P on communications matters. The ADPC concurred in  recommendation to enlarge the scope of the Communications element, but indicated that the object should be to serve the specific requirements of CIA and its components, which did not necessarily correspond to the requirements of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army. In summary, the ADPC recommended that the Communications Division be temporarily placed at a point within CIA which would make certain that it would serve operating requirements and would not be an independent or autonomous activity within the Agency. Until further organizational changes occurred, he considered it appropriate for the Chief, Communications Division to report to the DD/P. In the event OSO and OPC (and OO) were merged,

25X1

he then considered that the Chief, Communications Division should report to the Chief of the new, combined Office.

The ADSO concurred in the principle of co-equal status of the Office of Communications with that of other offices. 23/ He stressed, however, that Communications served the other offices entirely across the board more than any other office, and that controls and staff assistance then available to the Deputy Director (Plans) were insufficient to properly coordinate a large number of co-equal offices. In view of the fact that several inter-related organizational studies, including one on reorganization of the covert agencies of the CIA, were then in progress, the ADSO recommended that the subject of the position of Communications be considered in conjunction with these studies.

Another viewpoint was expressed by the Deputy Director (Administration). 24/ He stated that communications was an Agency function and that a proposal would be made to the Director that all communications be consolidated under an Assistant Director for Communications. Although he saw no current objection to the proposal that the new Assistant Director be under the operational control of the DD/P, he made the point that communications was more properly an administrative function, in support of operating offices rather than a strictly operating function.

25X1 Additional ideas relating to the communications organization were presented to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence by [ ] Executive Assistant to the DD/P. 25/ His comments reflected the view that communications effort was performed for the benefit of all offices and, as such, this work should not be under the control of a single office. He suggested further that the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch be transferred from OO to the Office of Communications. Arguments for this were that a significant part of FBIB's activities had to do with communications matters and its product was of general interest to various agencies of the Government, was performed by CIA under the "common concern" principle, but had little to do with the Offices under DD/P.

### 3. Establishment of the Office of Communications

25X1 The DCI's eventual decision as to the organizational position of Communications followed closely the original recommendations of [ ] The suggestion relative to the annexation of FBIB was not accepted. As of 1 July 1951, the Communications Division was separated from OSO and was established as the Office of Communications. 3/ [ ]  
25X1 was designated Acting Director for Communications, reporting

25X1 to the Deputy Director, Plans. This action was further formalized in 1 July 1951 changes to CIA Regulation  Appendix 2-D contains pertinent extracts from this Regulation, showing the position of Communications under DD/P, the organization of the Office of Communications, and a statement of the Mission and Functions of the Assistant Director for Communications.

D. PERSONNEL

1. General

The difficulty in obtaining sufficient numbers of personnel was a continuing drawback to the development of communications facilities at a rate matching the rapidly increasing operational requirements. The disparity between personnel and workload had reached such serious proportions in early 1949 that certain changes and deletions in the communications operational program were recommended (Section 1, Personnel vs. Workload). The problem at the time was not so much a lack of adequate personnel complement as it was an excessive number of job vacancies.

A proposal had been made in the Fall of 1947 that communications recruiting teams be sent to certain cities within the United States to attempt the procurement of radio technicians. 26/ This stemmed mostly from difficulties being encountered in manning stations of the Middle East Radio Network. By 1949 and continuing

into 1950, an organized recruiting effort was developed, with communications representatives assigned specifically to recruiting duties and conducting recruiting trips to cities throughout the States. This recruiting program, although bringing in sizable numbers of recruits, was not a cure-all. In fact, the critical personnel shortages continued throughout the developmental period.

The adverse effects on communications support of the continuing difficulties in procuring personnel were repeatedly pointed out by the Chief, Communications Division. In September 1950 he reported to the ADSO that the point was being reached where the Division would be unable to continue to meet its commitments and responsibilities overseas, and expressed the fear that OSO and OPC operations, then in process of implementation as well as others about to be activated, could not be supported unless the procurement and processing of personnel were accelerated. 27/ Although the existing Communications overseas T/O appeared adequate, less than 47 percent of the authorized personnel were actually on duty at overseas stations. This T/O comprised 297 personnel divided between EUCA, 73; ASCA, 90; MECA, 84; NATCA, 28; and SEACA, 22.

The personnel status as of mid-June 1951 while showing some improvement, continued to be unsatisfactory and at that

time the Chief, Communications Division, made the following comments and recommendations: 28/

"The lack of personnel in the Communications Division, particularly in training pools and overseas has reached such serious proportions that it appears doubtful whether present commitments can be met and communications activities vital to the support of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency properly carried out. The authorized T/O's established for the support of communications activities of this Agency have not been adequately filled since my assignment here nearly two years ago, and records indicate the same situation has existed since the organization of the Agency in 1947.

"As a result of the chronic personnel shortages in this Division, sound personnel rotation and training programs designed to build a strong cadre of communications officers experienced in intelligence communications have suffered considerably. Morale has been adversely affected by the uncertainty of the length of assignments due to lack of replacements; operations have been hampered and in some cases adversely affected. Many worthwhile programs and projects have been worked out only to fail of implementation or lose their effectiveness because suitable personnel were not available in sufficient numbers to prosecute and support them.

"After careful consideration of the entire problem and lengthy discussions with my staff, it is my opinion that the underlying cause of the present difficulties is lack of the assignment of a sufficiently high priority to the procurement and processing of Communications personnel..... In view of the 780 existing vacancies in the Communications Division T/O, it does not appear to me that sufficient effort is being expended to provide the required personnel support for the Communications Division.



"I recommend that consideration be given to one or more of the following proposals:

(a) A task force be organized in the personnel office consisting of a sufficient number of procurement officers and assistants to assure the complete coverage of all schools and colleges in the United States particularly state universities and small colleges as well as technical institutes and schools of a similar type.

(b) That general information be made available to prospective employees as to the type of work and opportunities to be expected together with a true picture of the interesting as well as difficult aspects of CIA communications as a career.

(c) That publicity be given to the opportunities afforded Communications personnel in the Central Intelligence Agency and a series of articles be published in periodicals likely to be read by students glamorizing the work of the intelligence communicator. Consideration should be given to discreet advertising..... I think if properly handled, the mention of the Central Intelligence Agency would be of advantage. If after proper consideration this were considered too undesirable, the possibility of the State Department sponsoring such advertising should be explored.

(d) That contractual arrangements be made with leading radio schools providing for procurement, holding, and training of communications personnel for the Central Intelligence Agency. This proposal has been made before but has not been implemented."

25X1 The Communications Training Branch was authorized to  
25X1 establish contact with various commercial radio schools with  
25X1 a view to ascertaining their capabilities and possibly develop-  
25X1 ing a pilot program with one or more. 29/ During 1951, pre-  
liminary contacts were made with the [redacted]  
[redacted]  
25X1 graphy, and the Technical Representative Division of the [redacted]  
25X1 [redacted] This effort had only moderate success,  
25X1 specifically a contract [redacted] to be effective in January  
1952, and involving the training of a limited number of students.  
25X1 [redacted] had been used as  
early as 1949 as a source of radio operators and technicians  
through a program of interviewing and selecting graduates. The  
security hazards in dealing with private institutions were high-  
lighted in 1950, when this school mailed some 800 letters to  
25X1 former graduates, openly identifying [redacted]  
25X1 [redacted] ) with CIA employment opportunities, as  
well as referring to the fact that large numbers of graduates  
had been hired by CIA in the past. Upon representations to the  
President of the school, these practices were discontinued, but  
any damage had already been accomplished. 30/

Early recruiting efforts included the use of advertise-  
ments in QST, official organ of the national amateur radio

association, the American Radio Relay League, and the publicizing of CIA employment opportunities through units of the Naval Reserve. 31/ The QST channel proved successful. In later years, active duty Naval personnel who were about to leave the service also proved to be a valuable source of manpower.

As mentioned previously, the principal difficulty was maintaining sufficient numbers of personnel actually on duty. T/O's in general were gradually increased as communications support requirements grew, but although approved T/O's existed, they were subject to the assignment of "ceilings" or superimposed levels above which T/O's could not be filled. The ratio of people on the job to those in training or in other phases of processing for assignment was never satisfactory as T/O's increased. Long delays in recruitment and in completing security clearances were major aggravations in getting people "on the job." An example of the time taken in the processing procedure is reflected in a list of pending personnel prepared in March 1949. 32/ There were 64 personnel for whom processing had been requested by Communications. Twenty-five percent of these requests had been made at least six months earlier, with several approaching one year's delay.

A comparison of T/O's and actual personnel at the approximate start and end of the developmental period (September 1947 - July 1951) follows:

	<u>T/O</u>	<u>Total on Duty</u> (Including in Process)	<u>Actually</u> "On the Job" (Percent of T/O)
August 1947	273	--	244 (90%)
December 1947	402	256	--
March 1951	807	655	462 (57%)
1 July 1951	1396*	775	606 (43%)

\*Fiscal Year 1952 T/O.

## 2. Consolidated OSO/OPC Communications T/O

As the communications support requirements for both OPC and OSO continued to grow, it was found impractical to maintain separate lists (T/O's) of communications personnel to serve OSO and OPC abroad. Following a series of conferences in which representatives of Management, Budget and Liaison Control, Special Employees Division, OPC, Staff B (Operations), and the Communications Division participated, a consolidated OSO/OPC Overseas T/O for the Communications Division was developed in November 1949. This totaled 291 positions, distributed as follows:

Asiatic Communications Activity (ASCA)	88
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 400px; height: 15px; display: inline-block;"></div> *	28
European Communications Activity (EUCA)	73
Middle East Communications Activity (MECA)	80
Southeast Asia Communications Activity (SEACA)	22

\*This title was subsequently changed to North Atlantic Communications Activity (NATCA)

A supplementary list of 46 communications personnel was carried on the Overseas T/O's of Foreign Divisions, making a combined total of 337 positions for communications personnel overseas. Incorporated in this total were 133 slots, which had been set up earlier by OPC for communications personnel. The new consolidated T/O was approved by ADGO and confirmed by ADPC on 29 November 1949.

In a 23 November 1949 memorandum of transmittal to OPC, 33/ the Executive Officer, OSO, noted that the new Communications Overseas T/O exceeded the OSO budgetary provisions for personnel for the current fiscal year by approximately \$1,000,000. The ADPC's reply, 34/ is quoted in part below as indicative of the support provided by OSO and of the importance placed by OPC on communications facilities:

"During the past fifteen months OPC has been placing an increasingly heavy burden upon the Communications Division of OSO. I wish to express appreciation for the services and facilities that have been provided as well as the cooperation and assistance we have received in planning our operations.

"OPC activities not only demand extensive communications services in normal times, but require operational facilities to handle emergency situations in any quarter of the world. This is particularly important since the Departments of State and Defense are relying upon OPC to perform certain emergency functions in the event of outbreak of hostilities.

To prepare for these requirements, OPC, with the help of the Communications Division, placed contracts for approximately \$2,000,000 of equipment during Fiscal Year 1949 and set about recruiting a substantial number of communications personnel. As this program progressed it became increasingly obvious that it would be necessary for reasons of technical efficiency and operational security to maintain the highest degree of coordination between the communications activities and operations of OSO and OPC.

"The current activities and future plans reflected in reference memorandum provide further proof of the desirability of effecting this coordination as soon as possible. In developing these plans OPC representatives explained that the communications requirements were so essential that the implementation of these plans should only be limited by our ability to recruit and train the staff and build the bases. If this requires a million dollars more than has been allocated to the Communications Division, it is essential that these funds be provided even though it may mean a limitation of substantive activities that were contemplated when the budget estimates were submitted. For that reason, OPC is willing to withdraw such funds as may be necessary from other activities and, with the permission of the Director, earmark them for communications use.

"In the third paragraph of reference memorandum it was requested that this Office confirm that the consolidated T/O will fulfill the needs of OPC for the balance of the present fiscal year. It is impossible to make such a statement because at best this T/O is merely a plan on the drawing board and does not provide facilities in being. We are, however, willing to certify that such a T/O does not exceed our requirements that the plan be implemented as soon as possible."

The decision to place communications personnel administratively under OSO resulted in the transfer to OSO of all communications slots appearing on the T/O's of OPC Branches, and all communications personnel employed against such slots were transferred to OSO. 35/ The term, "communications personnel," referred to those who had full time communications duties. Personnel whose duties were divided, that is, secretary-code clerks, remained on the OPC Branch T/O's.

#### E. LOGISTICS

##### 1. Supply and Warehousing

As of June 1947 Supply and Warehousing within OSO was a function of the Transportation and Supply Division (TSD). This Division included a Warehouse Section. Within the Communications Division, supply operations were controlled by a Signal Property Control Section, which in December 1947 had a T/O of eighteen personnel. At that time the consolidation of the Communications warehouse at [ ] with the general CIA supply warehouse operated at [ ] by the Service Branch had been approved. 36/ This necessitated the Communications Division to move its entire stock of signal equipment from [ ] and this move was well under way in April 1948. 37/ Coincident with the relocation, it was

proposed that the Communications Signal Property Control Section be eliminated and that this function be placed under OSO's Stock Control Unit, which was formerly the Warehouse Section. This action was approved on 1 April 1948. 38/

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25X1  
A further change in supply arrangements occurred in May 1948 when it was decided that OSO would operate a warehouse separate and apart from the general warehouse of the Service Branch. Movement of all OSO property from [ ] to the new OSO facility [ ] was scheduled to commence on 1 July 1948, and the ADSO requested additional positions for his Transportation and Supply Division. 39/  
This action was overtaken by CIA General Order No. 11 of 14 September 1948, the provision of which included the absorption by the Services Officer, CIA of the Transportation and Supply functions of OSO. The move to the [ ] Warehouse apparently did not take place. 40/

25X1  
Under the organizational changes effected by General Order No. 11, OSO was no longer directly responsible for communications warehousing. Nevertheless, its interest was paramount, as it had basic responsibility for providing communications for all of CIA, and a communications inventory



valued in excess of \$1,000,000 was involved. The Communications Division remained charged with the responsibility for providing communications services and electronics equipment, but under the new organization was in the untenable position of having this responsibility without any supervisory authority in the physical handling of the material. The Chief, Communications Division in expressing these views, indicated that the Communications Division, should control the supply and supervise the proper maintenance of this delicate equipment. 41/

Another factor confronting OSO concerned its Signal Property Accountable Officer. This Officer was personally, financially accountable for all signal (Communications) property in the CIA warehouses; yet, he had no physical control or direction over the storage or the personnel-handling of the bulk of the material. The ADSO requested that the responsibilities of the accountable officer be defined by directive, including procedures for the requisitioning and control of all property. 42/ The Acting Director of Central Intelligence indicated that definition of responsibilities and establishment of procedures for communications supply and warehousing would be worked out. 43/

At this same time, the incumbent OSO Signal Property Accountable Officer was to be transferred. His relief set forth


certain actions that should be accomplished prior to his assuming the duties of accountable officer. 44/ These included clarification of such matters as a memorandum receipt for material and a procedure requiring subsequent receipts by the Responsible Officer(s) having physical possession of the equipment and authorization over personnel handling materiel; chain of command for the accountable officer; and an outline of duties and basic procedures to be followed in the various functions of supply requisition, stock control, storage and issue, and procurement. The Executive Director, CIA, provided the requested chain of command information, but indicated that the other matters would be the responsibilities of the new Services Officer established by General Order No. 11, and that this Officer was developing and coordinating appropriate plans and procedures for the integration of a CIA overall supply responsibility. 45/

Subsequent conferences were held between OSO (Communications) representatives and the Services Officer, CIA, and procedures to be followed by the Services Office and by the Communications Division in handling signal property were established by Memorandum of Agreement dated 11 January 1949, (Appendix 2-E). The effect of the agreement was to relieve

the Communications Division of direct warehouse responsibility, but to remove no other previously held function and to add certain duties not previously assigned. The Chief, Communications Division requested the establishment of a section within the Division consisting of a limited number of personnel to carry out the functions and responsibilities assigned by the Memorandum of Agreement. A Supply Section was subsequently reestablished in the Communications Division.

## 2. Equipment Stockpiles

The subject of agent communications equipment was occupying much of the attention of the Joint OSO/OPC Communications Board in early 1950. Studies were directed at methods and procedures for the establishment of stockpiles and stock levels, procurement and requisition procedures, issuance control and priorities, and a general regulation to insure availability of equipment as needed. 46/ First steps were an inventory of equipment on hand and surveys by board members of their operational needs so that procurement could be planned.



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25X1  
In June 1950 the decision was reached that the OSO/OPC Communications Board would be responsible for establishing stock levels of agent radio equipments to be maintained both in Washington and in the field and for assigning priorities to projects involving the issuance of such equipment. This action was formalized by S. O. Directive [ ] later reissued as OSO Regulation [ ] Appendix 2-N) and by OPC Regulation [ ] of 6 July 1950.

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In accordance with its new responsibility, the Joint Board on 27 June 1950, after consultation with responsible using officials, designated the stock levels to be established and maintained throughout the world. 48/ The locations specified were Washington; [ ]

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[ ] included as possible stockpile locations. In late 1950, as a precautionary measure, it was decided that, except for material in use or required to support current operations, communications equipment at [ ] would be transferred [ ] for storage. This was accomplished in early 1951. 49/ By April 1951 [ ] had been selected as the location indicated previously as [ ] had replaced [ ] as a stockpile location (Section 4, Base Station Development and Construction, Western Mediterranean).

The following figures show the world-wide agent radio equipment stocks as of 25 June 1951:

Equipment

RS-1  
RS-5  
RS-6  
SSP 11/GN-58  
SSP-12  
AN-URC-4  
SSTR-1

\*Enroute indicates material processed for shipment or actually sent but not received at its overseas location and equipment on order from the manufacturer. Descriptions of the specific equipments will be found in Appendixes 2-L and 2-M.

The stockpile program was not limited to agent equipment. Conventional communications equipment items also were stocked, including a strategic reserve of "packaged radio stations" and mobile stations. The packaged stations were complete radio stations assembled for immediate shipment and stored at strategic locations. As of October 1950, packaged stations had been provided for emergency use  50/ In addition to meet requirements for other areas, units were being held in the Washington warehouse. A number of the latter "packages" were earmarked for possible use in Latin America (Section 3, Overseas Activities, Central and South America). Stockpiling at  in early 1951 took the form of a complete mobile radio base station.

In addition to existing facilities, studies were under way in May 1951 for establishment of communications equipment stockpiles at a number of additional strategic locations. 51/ Although moderate quantities of equipment, both conventional and agent, were maintained at major base stations, it was considered prudent to plan to augment existing stocks and create new stockpiles in other areas.

#### F. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

##### 1. Security Branch

Development of methods, tools, procedures, controls, and checks to insure the security of CIA communications and implementation and compliance actions were the responsibilities of the Communications Security Branch. This included diverse and multitudinous tasks performed by an organization containing the following elements:

- Office of the Chief
- Crypto Development Section
- Cover Methods and Procedures Section
- Protective Section
- Cryptomateriel Support Section

A continuing and intensified world crisis situation in late 1950 and early 1951 and the related increase in communications commitments had a direct effect on the support responsibilities of the Security Branch. As a step to cope with the increasing traffic workloads, a program was activated to convert, wherever

possible, from hand to machine ciphers. The establishment of a protective monitoring program for the Agency's radio networks was another high priority project. A third urgent requirement was a communications security inspection program to determine the adequacy of security in the Field.

## 2. Electric Cipher Machines

In January 1951, the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency was requested to authorize appropriate military security agencies to issue suitable electric cipher machines to CIA for use at its key stations. The volume of encrypted traffic between certain stations had increased to the extent that manual cryptographic systems were no longer adequate. In the event of all-out war, the volume was expected to increase to such an extent that unacceptable delays would occur unless electric cipher machines were available at the high-volume stations.

The machines (SIGTOT/TRADON) were made available as requested, and an enlarged program for conversion from manual to machine systems was started. This involved large-scale development, production, and analysis of systems, keys and keying material, as well as planning and preparation of new cover methods and procedures, together with instructional documents for field use. The introduction of machine ciphers was further complicated by

informal indication that the Armed Forces might not be able to continue offering their facilities and services for producing cryptomaterials for CIA in event of an all-out war. To be prepared for such a contingency, the Communications Security Branch had to make plans to assume responsibility for producing its own cryptomaterials (one-time pads, keying lists, keying aides, and keying tapes). Continuing technical support was provided by the Armed Forces Security Agency, and by the Army Security Agency before it, in the development and testing of cryptographic systems, devices, and procedures for use by CIA.

Cryptographic devices used in the Washington area in the early CIA years included the SIGTOT (also called TRADON) and the SIGHUAD. 52/ In May of 1948, arrangements were made to convert the cryptographic circuits operating between CIA and the Department of State from SIGTOT to SIGHUAD as the latter was faster and more efficient for handling the increasing traffic volumes. 53/

### 3. Radio Monitoring Project

A program of monitoring and traffic analysis of CIA radio circuits was established to determine the extent of intelligence which could be derived by the enemy from CIA communications, either by deductive or inductive analysis. The first monitoring




effort was conducted on the Latin American Radio Network in April and May 1951. The objective of this pilot project was two-fold: To determine the nature of the transmission security of the net and steps necessary for improvement, and to formulate standard operating procedures for future operations of the Radio Monitoring Unit. The importance of the program became immediately apparent as numerous operating discrepancies were observed. A second monitoring project covered the Middle East Radio Network. These monitoring exercises henceforth became a regular function of the Protective Section, Communications Security Branch, and served well in tightening the security of CIA radio operations.

#### 4. Physical Security Inspections


The establishment of physical security standards for communications facilities was a responsibility of the Security Branch. Examples of the items involved are contained in a list of "Security Recommendations for the Washington Signal Center" prepared in June 1948. 54/ Included were such things as measures to prevent viewing the Signal Center through windows; provision of artificial ventilation; blackout curtains; iron grilles; removal of signs identifying the activity, such as "Message Center" or "Signal Center"; establishment of controls for visitors; and emergency evacuation and destruction plans.

By direction of the ADSO, the Chief, Communications Division established a world-wide field station communications

security inspection program. Security officers from the Communications Security Branch visited field stations to inspect the physical security of CIA offices and to review cryptographic practices at the individual stations. These



The program was designed to assure that the arrangements for handling CIA traffic in the code rooms, the security accorded the storage of CIA cryptomaterial, and the security of conditions for the performance of CIA cryptographic work were satisfactory at the



##### 5. Cryptographic Control

One of the most exacting functions of the Communications Security Branch was the establishment and control of cryptographic communications. The Security Branch was responsible for the establishment and deactivation of all cryptographic

links between stations for both OSO and OPC. This was one of the most active security tasks during the developmental period as many new stations were activated, command channels changed, and some stations deactivated. Cryptographic control was a basic requirement for all communications, regardless of the mode of message transmission.

25X1 S. O. Procedure Guide [ ] dated 8 June 1949 set forth the procedures for requesting cryptographic staff communications. 55/ This was superseded by OSO Regulation [ ] (Appendix 2-F), which prescribed procedures to be followed when requests for cryptographic staff communications were submitted to the Communications Division. Procedures for issuing cryptographic clearances were established by OSO Regulation [ ] dated 1 November 1950, and the Communications Division was designated as the control office for such clearances. 56/ Special procedures were developed for the guidance of all communications personnel in preparing and handling correspondence on cryptographic and technical communications matters. 57/ To insure adequate controls in handling dispatches relating to cryptographic matters, the communications officer or communicator at each field station was authorized to communicate directly with the Chief, Communications Division. Dispatches relating to such matters were

25X1

25X1

captioned "CRYPTOGRAPHIC" and received sensitive handling. Included in these dispatches was information relating to crypto systems, equipment and material, communications security matters, transfer and destruction of cryptographic material, reports on cryptographic traffic volume, routing data, time delays, and related information covering the cryptographic handling of traffic. Similar direct communications with the Chief, Communications Division, was authorized for technical communications correspondence dealing with clandestine signal plans and related communications matters including radio and other transmission subjects. Policy governing crypto-communications for those field establishments which were permanently staffed by both OSO and OPC representatives employing similar official cover was established by [redacted] (Appendix 2-G).

Regulations required that the custodian of Armed Forces registered cryptographic material be a commissioned officer. The Chief, Communications Division, a Naval Officer, was custodian for CIA. His wide responsibilities as communications chief, including extended TDY absences from his office, made it difficult for him to exercise direct control of the functions of receiving, distributing, and accounting for registered cryptographic material. No other commissioned officer was attached

to the Communications Division, and the position of Chief, Communications, was to be eventually civilianized. To resolve the problem, the DCI obtained authority from the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, to appoint a civilian to serve as cryptographic custodian. 58/

The provision of emergency cryptographic communications between Washington and field stations was an integral part of the cryptographic responsibility of the Communications Division. In November 1947, action was being taken to provide all OSO substations with an emergency crypto link direct to Washington. 59/ This link was for activation in the event normal communications were cut off between the base station and Washington or if a grave emergency arose at the substation which necessitated direct communications with Washington.

25X1 A further step in emergency readiness was the storage of reserve supplies of cryptographic material at strategic locations throughout the world. This project, [ ] involved only cipher storage, not radio operations or signal plans. 60/

25X1 [ ] was established as a safe area for the storage of reserve ciphers and signal and cryptographic plans for each active clandestine project for which the European Communications Officer [ ] was responsible. This was to eliminate the necessity for rushing reserve copies from

25X1

Headquarters to the new base of operations in the event  
the [ ] should become neutralized operationally.

In mid-1950, cipher materials for the Headquarters Signal  
Center Disaster Plan [ ] were pouched to all stations. 61/  
The opposite ends of these pads were prepared for storage in  
[ ] Repository. Plan [ ] assured continuous cryptographic communications with all stations even if  
all material on hand in the Headquarters location ("L" Building)  
were destroyed by fire or other disaster. Emergency cipher  
material later was stored in the Interim CIA Vital Documents  
Repository [ ] With the establishment of  
an Emergency Signal Center at [ ], this  
material was moved to that location [ ]

On 1 December 1949, there were [ ] communications stations  
in operation, [ ] radio and [ ] cryptographic. These totals remained  
essentially unchanged through 1950. As of 1 March 1951, the total  
of OSO and OPC staff field stations having cryptographic communi-  
cations links was [ ] In addition, [ ] Contact Division stations  
and [ ] FBIS stations had cryptographic communications. With  
activation of the SEACA net, the total number of staff radio links  
had increased to [ ] The 1 July 1951 activation of the Office of  
Communications found cryptographic communications links at [ ] SO  
and OPC stations and [ ] FBIS stations. There was no change in  
Contacts coverage.

The transmission of classified messages over facilities employed by FBIB/FBIS did not start until 1949. Discussions relative to a procedure for transmitting classified material over FBIB facilities had been held in 1947. These were based on the fact that the consolidated list of FBIB monitoring targets and the transmission of this list in the clear gave definite indication of U. S. intelligence agencies' interests. However, after referral to the Deputy, DCI early in November 1947, FBIB was instructed to continue to transmit weekly targets in the clear over normal FBIB channels and to use facilities of the Communications Division for transmission of other classified matter.

This subject was again broached by the Assistant Director for Operations (OO) in September 1948. He pointed out to the DCI that existing procedures caused delays in the receipt of classified messages by FBIB field bureaus, due primarily to the lack of proximity of the field bureau to the closest point of traffic reception. He stated that operational efficiency could be improved by reducing the time of transmission between Washington and field bureaus and again requested that procedures be developed for the transmission of classified messages over FBIB facilities. The Chief, Communications Division outlined the steps necessary to meet FBIB's desires, and the proposals were approved by the DCI

25X1 on 28 December 1948. 62/ As indicated above, [ ] FBIS/FBIB  
stations had their own cryptographic links as of 1 July 1951.

25X1 Appendix 2-H presents three diagrams showing cryptographic  
links as of June 1950 to Far East areas, primary European sta-  
tions, [ ]

#### G. CABLES AND CIRCUITRY

##### 1. General

25X1 Uniform instructions and information on the preparation,  
processing, and handling of cables for the use and guidance of  
all OSO and OPC personnel were issued on 2 May 1950 as S. O.  
25X1 Procedure Guide [ ] (Revised) rescinding an earlier instruction  
of August 1947. 63/ Subsequently, cable procedures were modified  
25X1 and refined and eventually issued as OSO [ ]  
25X1 and OPC [ ] 64/

25X1 Basic policies governing the establishment and operation of  
lateral cable communications between CIA field stations were  
described in Communications Division Order [ ] 65/ As  
direct lateral cable communications between field stations could  
jeopardize the staff communications cover links serving the two  
stations, requests for such communications were restricted to  
situations where the hazard was justified by the operational con-  
venience provided by direct lateral links. Prior to activation  
of a lateral cable communications link between two field stations,



the Chief of the Headquarters Foreign Division or Area Staff desiring the link was required to document the nature and scope of the requirement. The Chief, Communications Division, then initiated a study leading to determination of the feasibility and extent the lateral communications could be provided consistent with the preservation of communications cover. If necessary conditions were met, and the approval of the appropriate Assistant Director obtained, steps to activate the link were taken.

25X1      S. O. Procedure Guide [ ] (Revised) stipulated the following governing the destruction of cables:

"The destruction of cables is the responsibility of each Office, Staff, or Division. In order to comply with existing security regulations governing the destruction of classified documents, those cables destroyed will be itemized in duplicate and one copy of the certification of destruction sent to the Signal Center for permanent file. This itemization will list the "IN" or "OUT" number, name of field station, the year in which the cable was dispatched, and the distribution copy number."

25X1      The problems resulting from following these regulations were discussed by the Chief, Staff B. 66/ Estimates made by Staffs A, B, and C of the time required to list and destroy cables as specified indicated that thirty seconds of an employee's time was required for each copy. The Communications Division estimated that an average of [ ] messages with [ ] copies were distributed to OSO at Headquarters daily. An average

25X1

of six copies of each message was made at stations overseas. Thus, in the course of a year, [ ] copies of the cables had to be destroyed. At thirty seconds each, destruction of the cables represented the full time of five employees. As an example of the burden on an individual office, Staff B's certificate of destruction of cables for one month was a thirty-four page list. Argument for the procedure on security grounds was offset by the fact that lists of destroyed cables received in the Signal Center were not checked against lists of cables originally distributed, a task beyond the manpower capabilities of the Signal Center; and even if they had been checked and all copies accounted for, the information contained in the cables could have been transmitted illegally or copies made. Some units of OSO were compelled by workload considerations to postpone compliance indefinitely, and the Chief, Staff B, concluded that it was fundamentally unsound to maintain regulations that could not be followed.

At the request of the Joint OSO/OPC Communications Board, the Communications Division made a study of the contested cable destruction procedures, which, incidentally, had been approved originally by the Board, OSO, and OPC. It was concluded that the existing destruction procedure was cumbersome, time-consuming, and unnecessary, and that it was virtually impossible to effect destruction in accordance with the prescribed procedure. 67/ No Agency

25X1 regulation existed placing distribution copies of cables in the category of registered documents; yet, the destruction procedure followed the same pattern as that used for destruction of registered documents. In addition, it was further concluded that the loss of a cable had no cryptographic security implications. Revised procedures were adopted and published in OSO Regulation   of 1 November 1950 as follows:

"Each Office is responsible for the secure retention and/or destruction of distribution copies of cables received. Offices may destroy copies of cables whenever convenient and in accordance with their own internal Office procedures."

Pursuant to agreement of the Joint OSO/OPC Communications Board, the Signal Center was relieved of the responsibility and accountability for cable copies that had been or would later be distributed by the Signal Center to any recipient. 68/ The Signal Center continued to obtain receipts for all cables distributed and maintained a permanent record of such distribution. This incident relating to cable destruction regulations provides a lesson in the pitfalls of over-ambitious security controls.

An example of cooperation between CIA offices in keeping traffic moving occurred at the outset of the Korean conflict. While capable of coping with sporadic traffic increases, the Headquarters Signal Center was hard put to handle the inordinate influx resulting from the outbreak of hostilities. The Chief,

Communications Division, requested that those personnel in the OSO Foreign Divisions and Staffs who had cryptographic experience or training be made available during the emergency period on a part-time or overtime basis to assist in the Signal Center. The names of twenty-eight OSO personnel were provided to the Communications Division, and these individuals were available for overtime service in the Signal Center as necessary. 69/

Traffic volumes provide one measurement of communications activity. While available statistics for the early CIA years are sketchy, a sampling of traffic volumes is possible. Representative totals of traffic processed by the Washington Signal Center during the period 1948 to 1951 reflect the upward trend in communications workload:

<u>Handled</u> <u>For</u>	<u>December</u> <u>1948</u>	<u>November</u> <u>1949</u>	<u>June 1950</u>	<u>July 1950</u>	<u>May 1951</u>
------------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------------	------------------	------------------	-----------------

OSO/OPC  
(Groups)

OO (Groups)

Non-CIA  
(Messages)

\*OSO Only

\*\*Marked Increase Attributed to Korean War

The ever-present problem of maintaining a balance between personnel and workload is reflected in a "Traffic-Personnel Analysis" made as of July 1951. 70/ This shows that although

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## 2. Intelligence Dissemination Network

Early in 1948, it was decided that a five-way Intelligence Dissemination (ID) cryptographic network should be established to link the Central Intelligence Agency with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of Army, Navy, Air Force, and State as a means for making expeditious distribution of Preliminary Dissemination Reports to members of the intelligence community. 75/ In June of 1948 a wire circuit was installed between the CIA Signal Center and the Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army, Pentagon Building. 76/

The ID network never developed to the extent originally planned. The circuits to the Departments of Navy and Air Force never were installed. Initially, the Department of State also chose not to join the network, as it felt that existing facilities were adequate. 77/ However, in July 1950 at the urging

of the Army, the Department of State (Office of Research and Intelligence) was finally tied into the system. 78/ Distribution of the dissemination reports to the Navy and Air Force were accomplished through the Department of the Army Cryptographic Center.

As time passed, the Department of State made little use of the special circuit and eventually reverted to the exclusive use of the regular CIA-State tie-lines for receiving the disseminations. This left the Army as the only participant in the original network concept. Army use was later curtailed, although both the Departments of State and Army circuits remained in being. Ultimately, steps were taken to deactivate all circuits connected with the ID network. 79/

In addition to the ID circuits, various other special arrangements were made through the years to speed the handling of intelligence information. Of particular note was a machine-cipher teletype circuit established in early 1951 between the Washington Signal Center ("L" Building) and the Office of the DCI (Administration Building) to expedite the dissemination of particularly "hot" reports and other urgent traffic. 80/

### 3. Department of Defense

CIA always was heavily dependent on the military services for communications support, particularly between Washington and overseas points. Good working relationships existed with the

military and cooperation was generally satisfactory; however, requirements were levied piecemeal and no definite agreements existed for support in time of war. Accordingly, in July 1950 action was being taken to request firm agreements by the military services for a continuation during wartime of the support then being afforded. 81/

Within the Department of Defense, the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee (JCEC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the Agency responsible for coordination of military telecommunications activity and for liaison with other Government departments. In November 1950, formal liaison between JCEC and CIA was established and the Chief, Communications was named as the CIA representative. 82/

Procedures were established whereby CIA's overall requirements for military traffic handling support were submitted to the JCEC for coordination and approval. These submissions were revised from year to year and included both peacetime and wartime circuit and traffic volume requirements. All Agency needs were incorporated in the presentations including FBID wartime requirements. Upon acceptance by the JCEC, the submissions became definite commitments by the military for normal and wartime support.

Another type agreement with the military concerned the maintenance by the Army of teletypewriter and associated equipment used by CIA in the continental United States. This agreement was dated 1 July 1950. 83/



## H. TRAINING

Increased demands from OSO and OPC for overseas communications personnel and the emergency conditions generated by the Korean War necessitated steps to accelerate the security clearance and training of communications personnel. Valuable time was being lost as the result of delays incident to obtaining full security clearances. To offset the gap between recruitment and the time personnel could be placed in training, the Chief, Communications Division, in the fall of 1950, proposed that during the time prospective employees were undergoing investigation they be granted provisional clearances and enrolled in unclassified basic communications training. His proposal was for the establishment of a Basic Communications Course for such personnel to operate under a special training section in the Communications Branch. 84/ Instruction was to include International Morse Code, radio theory, practical laboratory work, basic operating procedures, elementary cryptography, and touch typewriting, all materials used to be unclassified. During the time students were in training, approximately 18 weeks, full security clearances would be completed, after which graduates of the basic course would enter the Advanced Communications Courses and be processed for overseas assignments.

On 31 October 1950 the DCI approved the proposals for training provisionally cleared personnel. This approval covered

25X1 the establishment of a Basic and Intermediate Communications  
25X1 Training School for approximately 100 students. The problem  
25X1 of finding adequate space for this special program took a  
25X1 fortuitous turn with the establishment of the Agency's  
25X1 relocation headquarters [ ] 85/ It was  
25X1 determined that suitable space and facilities could be pro-  
25X1 vided, and the ADSO's request to locate the basic training  
25X1 school [ ] was approved. 86/  
25X1 Use [ ] for a communications training program not only  
25X1 expedited training and overseas assignment of personnel, but  
25X1 it also provided [ ] with an interim, live activity during  
the period it fulfilled its primary mission as a standby emer-  
gency relocation headquarters.

25X1 Detailed requirements for facilities to accommodate 100  
25X1 students and an instructor staff of 15 were developed. 87/  
25X1 Plans called for a site for the training facilities [ ]  
[ ] for certain phases of instruc-  
tion and constructing a new building for the teletype and power  
equipment maintenance course. Renovation of [ ] to  
provide classrooms, offices and recreational facilities and con-  
struction of a communications shop building for teletype and  
power generator instruction, and to include a room equipped for  
simulated radio net operations were included in a contract

25X1 covering other [ ] readiness measures. Work on these  
25X1 facilities was started in May 1951. 88/

25X1 [ ] renovations and construction were expected  
25X1 to take four to five months. The urgency of the training  
25X1 program could not accept this delay. It was decided therefore  
25X1 to provide the training at [ ] pending  
completion of the [ ] facilities. The [ ] con-  
tained dormitories and classrooms, but these were designed  
for small classes. A crash program was undertaken to remodel  
the facilities to provide adequate floor space. The class-  
room building was rewired to carry the increased electrical  
load, and day rooms and library facilities were located in  
the dormitory buildings. 89/

25X1 By June 1951, sufficient readying of facilities had been  
accomplished to permit activation of the training program, and  
on 11 June, fifteen students were enrolled in the first radio  
class [ ] 90/ By August, 48 students had been enrolled in  
the communications courses. Subjects covered included basic  
radio, power supplies, amplifiers, transmitters, receivers,  
antennas, teletype maintenance, and associated cryptographic  
devices. Practice nets for radio operator training were estab-  
lished, in addition to work in the regular radio code rooms.

25X1 The communications training continued [ ] until  
25X1 October 1951 when the [ ] paces were completed.

25X1 [ ] Chief Instructor, Auxiliary  
Training Section of the Communications Training Branch, was  
25X1 transferred [ ] 23 February 1951 as Communications Officer-  
25X1 in-Charge. 90/ [ ] was responsible for all communica-  
25X1 tions activity [ ] including development and supervision of  
the training program, operation of the Emergency Signal Center,  
and coordination of plans for remodeling and new construction  
25X1 as it related to communications requirements. [ ]

communications activity was subsequently designated, Training  
Section No. 2 of the Communications Training Branch. The  
25X1 [ ] for  
purposes of identifying communications activities at that  
installation.

25X1 [ ] of the Auxiliary Training Section  
25X1 had preceded [ ] as Chief Technician for the  
communications activity. In April 1951, he received permanent  
orders as Training Officer of the Teletype Maintenance Course,  
25X1 and [ ] was permanently assigned as Chief, Training  
Section No. 2. 90/ To assist in readying the facility, three  
radio trainees from Washington were assigned on a 30-day TDY  
basis, and one employee of the Washington Signal Center also

25X1 was assigned on TDY. As of 28 June, the training staff was comprised of the Chief; a Supervisor/Training Officer, Radio Officer [redacted]; two Training Officers, Radio; and two Training Officers, Teletype and Power Unit Maintenance. 90/

25X1 Communications Training was the subject of OSO Regulation [redacted] of 1 November 1950. 91/ This covered qualifications for enrollment, requests for enrollment, and the scope of training available. There were three general types of courses offered by the Communications Training Branch: Cryptographic, Radio Communications, and Special. The Special Courses were designed to prepare personnel for unusual communications and surveillance operations, not included in the other curricula. Cryptographic training prepared staff personnel to perform or assist with cryptographic duties at a staff cover station. Two subcourses made up the staff cryptographic course. One was the standard course to fully qualify the trainee for cryptographic duty. The second was a briefing course to qualify a student to assist in cryptographic duties under supervision and in an emergency to perform cryptographic duties with the help of written instructions. A clandestine cryptographic course was given for personnel to be assigned in clandestine cryptographic activities. This training comprised a basic course to train students to follow written instructions for a specific clandestine operation and a second

course especially designed to train in all aspects of cryptographic duties to be performed in a given operation. The standard radio communications course covered those phases of radio communications activities peculiar to CIA and included training in International Morse Code, minor maintenance of radio equipment used in the operation concerned, basic radio theory, and communications procedures. A radio familiarization course was also conducted.

Prior [ ] the Communications Training Branch was organized into four sections and a Headquarters staff: 89/

Headquarters Staff	Chief, Training Branch Deputy Chief
Auxiliary Training Section	Chief Instructor
Covert Training Section	Chief Instructor
*Cryptographic Training Section	Chief Instructor
Radio Training Section	Chief Instructor

\*The Cryptographic Section was formerly the Cipher and Security Instruction Unit, known in the Field as the Cryptographic Training School.

The Auxiliary, Cryptographic, and Radio Training Sections were located on the second floor of [ ] in Washington. The Covert Training Section operated in safehouses. During 1949 and 1950, personnel enrolled in cryptographic training averaged about 60 per month. This compared with from 20 to 40 per month

in 1947 and 1948. The Radio Training Section had an enrollment of approximately 50 per month in 1949 and 1950, and the Auxiliary Training Section was providing training up to 15 per month. Prior to the transfer of electronics surveillance responsibility to OAD, this type of instruction was also given.

The Covert Training Section was responsible for providing all forms of communications training to covert personnel. Before 1951, students were "singletons" or teams of two. This required segregated training areas and stringent security precautions to prevent breaches of both sites and personnel. During 1951, emphasis shifted to group instruction, with teams of five to eight students trained as a class. This permitted more efficient use of instructors. During the first half of 1951, twenty-three covert students received training in such subjects as radio, WT, cryptography, and in isolated cases, surveillance techniques. 92/ The Communications Division also assisted the CIA Training Division in its paramilitary training program by detail of instructors to

25X1  and to a facility in Washington, D. C., for presentation of communications subjects. This support consisted of providing, several times during 1950 and 1951, training of up to 50 hours in radio familiarization, cryptography, and communications security. Included was group training for OPC covert staff officers preparing to conduct

25X1 [redacted] in various overseas locations. At  
about mid-1951, plans were being made for an expanded para-  
military training program to be activated in 1952 at a new  
25X1 field location [redacted]

25X1 The advent of the [redacted] resulted  
in a reorganization of the Communications Training Branch. 89/  
The courses covered by the Auxiliary Training Section (tele-  
type and cryptographic machine maintenance and auxiliary power  
25X1 equipment) were incorporated into [redacted] curricula, as were  
the basic portions of the Radio Training Course. Thus the  
Auxiliary Section ceased to exist as such, and the Radio Train-  
25X1 ing Section functions were divided between [redacted]  
The reorganization of the Training Branch also eliminated the  
Radio Training Section. The new organization was based on the  
category of students rather than upon the type of instruction  
25X1 offered. A new Training Section No. 1 [redacted] provided  
classified training in the fields of cryptography, teletype  
operating, and a radio equipment course, plus any additional  
radio operating and theory training required by specific students.  
25X1 Training Section No. 2 [redacted] provided training in power equip-  
ment, teletype maintenance, basic radio theory, and radio  
operating. A third Section, the Covert Training Section,  
remained unchanged.



## I. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT STAFF

25X1 The Special Equipment Staff (SES), under the Chief of Operations, OSO, was created by S. O. Directive [ ] of 6 June 1947. Its primary responsibility was to determine operational requirements for technical devices and special equipment and to present such needs to the Cover and Documentation Division (CDD) and the Communications Division so that they could provide them. The specific charter for SES was established in Section III of Directive [ ] 93/ In essence, SES was the liaison and communication channel between the operating divisions and the Communications and Cover and Documentation Divisions for transmitting requirements.

25X1

Appendix 2-J is an assessment of the requirements and procedures for operations support prepared by the Chief of Operations on 24 November 1947 based on experience under the SES concepts. It was found that there was no provision for numerous specialized support functions essential to future field operations. Weaknesses existed in the preparation of equipment for the field and in the availability of technicians to assist field personnel in the details of installation or application. Several changes in supply procedure were also found necessary for SES to function properly as the control point for Operations in all matters of operational equipment.

25X1 The three areas of operations support functions were  
25X1 Communications [redacted]

[redacted] The organizations with primary responsibilities for the necessary support were the Communications Division, the Cover and Documentation Division (CDD), and the Transportation and Supply Division (TSD), all of which operated under the Chief of Administration and Services (CAS). The Operations' Training Staff (TRS) had corollary support functions, for example, [redacted] TSD's functions related only to supply matters.

Operations support functions were divided on the basis of electrical and non-electrical equipment. The Communications Division handled all electrical and electronic matters; CDD handled all non-electrical aspects. Specifically, the Communications Division was responsible for the electrical and cipher functions of communications and for the electrical functions of surveillance and observation.

The Chief of Operations' study also covered the development of an SES Inventory of Specialized Equipment and Operational Aids and the establishment of stockpiles of special equipment. The items in the stockpile were to be kept by the unit most relevant to their use; for example, the Communications Division would have the electrical and electronic equipment, such as radios, parts,

recorders, supplies, and electrical surveillance devices.

Also proposed was a new procedure for handling supply requests from the field. Existing practice was for requests from the field to be routed to TSD, placing that unit in a position of overall coordinator of action, while its basic function was supply and preparation for delivery. The proposed procedure was that field requests would be routed to the appropriate Foreign Branch for action and approval. If approved, all requests covering special equipment would be passed to SES. Based on data from the Foreign Division, SES would then formulate appropriate specifications for the Division (CDD, Communications, or TSD) best able to fulfill the requirements.

S. O. Procedure Guide [ ] established the supply procedures proposed above, at the same time describing the overall responsibilities and functions of SES. (Appendix 2-K).

In late 1948, SES was involved in an internal dispute between CDD, Foreign Division T, and the OSO Station at

[ ] concerning a requirement for an [ ]

[ ] The result was a recommendation in January 1949 by the Acting ADSO that SES be abolished. 94/ This was followed in March 1949 by a recommendation by [ ] Executive Officer to the DCI, that SES be eliminated and its functions assumed by the Cover and Documentation Division or the Communications Division, as appropriate. At this time,

Captain Ford recounted the circumstances surrounding the

25X1 [redacted] incident. 95/ The Chief of Operations

defended SES in a memorandum of 13 April 1949 to the  
ADSO. 96/ He stated that SES had made an honest effort  
to do its job, but pointed out that if the technical branches  
did nothing with the recommendations of SES, which were based  
on needs expressed by the field stations, then the whole pro-  
cedure would become pure theory and SES was in fact impotent  
and unproductive. He concluded by recommending that SES be  
liquidated and that requests for equipment be routed from  
the operating divisions direct to the technical divisions;  
that requirements for training be handled direct between the  
foreign branches, technical divisions, and the training staff;  
and that ADSO's staff establish priorities on equipment requests,  
compile OSO operational requirements for technical support,  
coordinate radio stay-behind planning, and coordinate research  
and development projects.

In May 1949, the Chief, Special Equipment Staff reviewed  
the status of technical support to OSO field operations and  
made recommendations on the organization of technical support  
functions. 97/ His principal recommendation was for the estab-  
lishment of a Technical Support Staff, under a Technical Support  
Officer reporting direct to the ADSO. The proposals included

the liquidation of the Cover and Documentation Division as a separate entity and the transfer of its personnel and facilities to the new Staff; the transfer from the Communications Division of the responsibility for electrical surveillance and other non-communications activities; organization of an Operations Office within the Technical Support Staff, parallel to the Operations Office of the Communications Division, to assist the Technical Support Officer in liaison with the Foreign Branches and in coordinating a field technical support program; establishment of Technical Support Staff overseas elements; and transfer to the new staff of responsibility and facilities for all technical instruction and research then carried on within the Training Staff (TRS). He proposed further that the Communications Division be redesignated as the Communications Staff under a Communications Officer (the existing Chief, Communications) and reporting direct to the ADBO.

No specific documentation is found pin-pointing the abolishment of SES but it apparently ceased to exist as such upon the advent of the OSO reorganization as set forth in OSO Directive   of 11 October 1949. <sup>98/</sup> Under this Directive, the Office of the Chief of Operations (COPS) was eliminated and certain functions formerly assigned to COPS were reassigned among the new Staffs A (Operational), B (Plans), C (Special Intelligence),

and D (Counterintelligence). SES was no longer included in the OSO organizational structure. An Operational Aids Division (OAD) appeared as an element reporting direct to the ADSO. Actually, OAD was a new name for the Cover and Documentation Division (CDD), but the redesignation consisted merely of a change in title.

25X1 The demise of SES is further confirmed in OSO Regulation No. [ ] of 1 November 1950, which assigned to OAD the responsibilities for Special Equipment previously handled by SES. 99/

Following the amalgamation of the OPC Research and Development element into OAD/OSO in June 1951, OAD became known as MADO (Material Assistance and Development Office). 100/ Somewhat later, about September 1951, the MADO title was replaced by TSS (Technical Services Staff).

#### J. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE

Despite the specific recommendations of the Chief of Operations relating to operational support requirements in the surveillance field (Appendix 2-J), little progress was made in dealing with the problem. As late as the Summer of 1949, there was evidence of confusion, or possibly lethargy, in actively coming to grips with surveillance matters. No office had overall equipment and operational responsibility for surveillance effort. The engineering group of the Communications Division

had accepted responsibility for solving all problems throughout the Agency, which were described as "electrical." These ranged from the development and planning of base radio installations through various kinds of communications devices, including recorders and other electronic aids to be used in surveillance work. The Chief, Communications Division, stated at the time that this responsibility for such electrical/electronics matters had been tacit and not at the direction of any responsible officer other than the Communications Chief. 101/ It is noted, however, that on 24 November 1947, the Chief of Operations (Appendix 2-J), had specified that existing responsibility for electrical communications matters and the electrical aspects of surveillance and observation rested with the Communications Division. He also made reference to the fact that the Communications Division had a developments laboratory. It appears, therefore, that the fact that the Communications Division was engaged in the pursuit of electrical/electronic equipment problems, including surveillance matters, was a recognized fact, whether or not such activity may have been by default of others rather than by specific directive of higher authority.

Confusion in operational responsibility also was claimed by the Chief, Communications Division, citing the fact that Inspection and Security came into the picture in the continental

U. S. and SES or other offices when foreign opportunities presented themselves. He made several recommendations, one of which was that the exact responsibilities of the Communications Division in electronics surveillance, both developmental and operational, be defined.

The OSO Executive Officer in commenting to the ADSO, stated as his belief that the responsibilities of the Communications Division in electronic surveillance were and had been well settled as falling within the communications charter, but that it appeared that the Communications Division had not accepted the charter as being clear-cut enough to warrant "any really constructive effort on their part." 102/

Apparently as an outgrowth of the existing controversy, the Communications Division was, on 19 September 1949, specifically assigned responsibility for surveillance activities which used electrical or electronic means. 103/ This action was rescinded on 18 January 1950 when responsibility for all surveillance activities was assigned to the Operational Aids Division (OAD) of OSO. 104/

The assignment of the surveillance function to OAD followed a study made by the Chief, Communications Division. 105/ A principal point made in suggesting the transfer was that the fundamental mission of the Communications Division was the



provision and handling of rapid communications. The obtaining of records of conversations and discussions electrically was considered in no sense pertinent to rapid communications, and the only connection that surveillance had with the Communications Division was said to be the fact that electronic recording devices used vacuum tubes and wires in their make-up.

The transfer of the surveillance function to OAD did not relieve the Communications Division of all responsibility in surveillance matters. Pending adequate facilities and personnel within OAD, it was agreed between the Chief, Communications Division, and the Chief, OAD, as follows:

a. All phases of surveillance training of Communications personnel would continue to be handled by the Communications Division until OAD was fully organized and staffed to undertake such training. The training of foreign branch and agent personnel would continue as a responsibility of OAD as was then the practice.

b. Surveillance training at overseas posts would continue to be given by communications personnel until such time as the OAD T/O allowed for the assignment of surveillance personnel overseas.

c. Research and development of electronics equipment for surveillance purposes would be conducted by the Engineering Branch of the Communications Division. One engineer would be detailed to OAD full time for this purpose and would have full use of all facilities of the Engineering Branch.

d. Control of existing stocks and additional procurement of surveillance materiel was the responsibility of OAD.

e. Testing of electronics surveillance gear, both when received for stock and prior to packing for shipment, would continue to be carried out by the Inspection and Testing Unit of the Engineering Branch, Communications Division.

f. OAD would budget for development, procurement, and all other activities in connection with electronics surveillance in the next fiscal year.

All overseas stations were notified that the surveillance function had been transferred to OAD, but that communications personnel in the field would continue to assist in the installation and maintenance of electronic surveillance equipment under the staff supervision of OAD at Headquarters. 106/ In this connection, all stations were requested to submit a complete

inventory of surveillance equipment in their possession and to comment on its adequacy and reliability.

The split responsibility, OAD/Communications, resulted in some jurisdictional problems between the Electronics Surveillance Branch of OAD and the Engineering Branch of the Communications Division. The following actions, approved by the ADBO in August 1950, were designed to resolve the difficulties by placing surveillance functions more firmly in OAD: 107/

a. An electronics engineer was to be transferred from Communications to the Electronics Surveillance Branch, OAD, where he would assume the position of Chief for all surveillance activities.

b. OAD would immediately assume full responsibility for the requisitioning and actual testing of all surveillance equipment.

c. Prior to 1 September 1950, all property accounts and inventories of property then utilized by the Surveillance Branch would be transferred from Communications to OAD, such transfer of accountability to include all property recognizable as surveillance equipment, to include testing equipment.

d. Two rooms in Temporary "L" Building would be provided for the Electronics Surveillance Branch within three months. In the interim, the Surveillance Branch would remain at its existing location within the Communications Branch space at the [ ] warehouse.

K. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

1. General

The Agency organization provided no office with overall responsibility for Research and Development (R&D) as a function. Thus it was in the early CIA days that offices having interest and need to pursue actual research and development did so individually.

The Office of Research and Evaluation, later renamed Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), perhaps came closest to having a basic charter in the R&D field; but, its interest was primarily in the collection of information and compilation of data. As originally organized in the CIG era, basic functions of ORE, exercised through its Technical and Scientific Branch, included the determination of technical and scientific developments as might effect the national security of the United States. One duty was to maintain close liaison with Government research and development activities in the fields of technology and science.

The Research and Development Board (RDB) of the National Military Establishment was activated on 30 September 1947. Its predecessor had been the Joint Research and Development Board (JRDB) of the Army and Navy. Close cooperation had been established between CIA and the JRDB, and the Scientific Branch of ORE was the Office having major cognizance in JRDB matters. With the formation of the new RDB, the Chief, Scientific Branch, ORE, was designated the principal CIA liaison between CIA and RDB, with responsibility to arrange and coordinate the working relationships of offices of CIA with appropriate divisions, committees, or individuals of RDB. In that connection, the Communications Division, OSO, requested an observer on RDB subpanels and panels relating to communications equipment and electronic components. 108/

Later, reorganization established within CIA an Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), and the task of providing scientific and technical estimates, etc., to such organizations as RDB then became the responsibility of OSI. CIA Regulation   of 19 January 1951 reflects that ORE had become ORR (Office of Research and Reports), and its mission specifically excluded scientific intelligence.

2. R&D Within OSO

OSO procedures covering research and development were defined on 1 April 1948. 109/ SES was established as the Office

having primary cognizance in R&D matters. All research and development projects were to be cleared through SES. Any ideas for research and development were to be considered by SES (1) for practicability (in consultation with Communications Division and/or Cover and Documentation Division), and (2) for operational need (in consultation with COPS, the Foreign Branch Chiefs, and other operational elements as appropriate). If recommended for action, a formal R&R project was prepared by SES, forwarded to COPS for approval and hence to CAS for coordination and to ADSO for final authorization.

Funds approved for each project were allotted to the technical division responsible; for electrical items, Communications Division; for non-electrical equipment, C&D. The responsibility of these Divisions included preparation of specifications, technical direction of work by outside contractors, and testing of new equipment. SES represented Operations to ascertain that specifications met operational requirements, to check progress on developments, and on final testing of equipment prior to completion of the project.

Within the Communications Division, responsibilities in the R&D field were carried out by the Engineering Branch. Appendix 2-L contains three summaries of the status of R&D projects at various points in time: April 1949; February 1950; and January 1951. Some actual research and development work was done in the

engineering laboratories of the Communications Division, but the major portion was handled under contracts with electronic development and manufacturing concerns. The most sensitive projects requiring an intimate knowledge of the Agency's operations were accomplished to a maximum extent within the Communications Division laboratories.

Detailed descriptions of the principal clandestine-type communications equipment in use or under development during this period of history (SSTR-1, RS-1, RS-5, RS-6, AN-URC-4) are contained in Appendix 2-M.

The project of first priority in early 1951 was the RS-6 miniature agent radio transmitter-receiver. The background on development of this equipment was recounted by the Chief, Communications Division. 110/ Impatience was being shown by the operating elements and delays in the availability of the RS-6 were questioned.

The RS-6 was conceived as a postwar refined version of the OSS Model TR-1 clandestine radio equipment. It was recognized early that replacement equipment with equal or superior operating characteristics to the TR-1 must be provided as stocks of the TR-1 were becoming depleted. However, the "stay-behind" type operation being planned and mounted in 1948 required quite different radio equipment which would be waterproof and capable of prolonged burial under a wide range of conditions. The RS-1

was developed for this need, and it became an overriding requirement, along with urgent requirements for unconventional air/ground VHF systems. These projects largely absorbed the capacity of the Communications Electronic Development Section until 1 April 1950. Development of the RS-6 proceeded on a priority basis from that date, and final laboratory models, plans, and specifications were completed in September 1950.

25X1  
Meanwhile, pressure for the RS-6 was increasing, and the ADCS directed that action be taken to provide earliest availability of this new equipment. Maximum effort was made for the early award of an engineering/production contract, and by October 1950, arrangements were under way with [redacted] There followed a series of availability estimates, starting with April 1951 and advancing to May and June, but further production delays developed and no deliveries had been made by July. At least one Foreign Division had firmly scheduled one agent and tentatively scheduled two other agents for dispatch in mid-July on the basis of expected availability of the RS-6 resulting in confusion and undefined effect on operational plans. This experience was well described at the time by [redacted] of the Communications Division, Administrative Staff, as an example of the "fallacy of too much optimism." If the circumstances contain additional lessons, they must be complete realism in estimates of equipment production times and plans of the ultimate user, the operations

25X1



elements must be tempered by the fact that the best laid plans and the most honest intentions are subject to inevitable production delays.

The advent of the Korean War posed a possible threat to the continued development and production of communications equipment peculiar to the needs of the Agency. It was realized that in the event of general mobilization the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) would impose material and production controls. Recognizing that additional contacts with NSRB would be necessary during any period that such controls were in effect, steps were taken in July 1950 to initiate discussions with NSRB officials to obviate any later obstacles to the continued development and procurement of vital CIA equipment. 111/

### 3. R&D Within OPC

As of May 1949, OPC research and development responsibility was assigned to the Chief, Research and Development Staff. His functions were defined as follows: 112/

- a. To serve as the top level technical advisor on scientific matters to all elements of OPC;
- b. To advise and assist the Office in the development (including procurement of sufficient pre-production units for appraisal and test),
- c. Formulation and establishment of plans, policies, and operations requiring scientific efforts,

d. To develop or arrange for the development of the necessary operational devices and equipment to support the activities of OPC.

In March 1951, the Chief, Administration and Logistics, OPC, reviewed the organization for research and development at OPC and CIA staff levels and made certain recommendations. 113/ At that time the R&D functions in OPC were performed by an R&D Branch, an element of the Administration and Logistics Staff. This Branch was responsible for the evaluation and coordination of all research and development requirements of the OPC Operating Divisions; for the determination of functional characteristics inherent in such requirements; and for the initiation of action, through the CIA Procurement Office, to satisfy them. In addition, the R&D Branch of OPC had exercised, on behalf of CIA, the responsibility of providing liaison in technical matters between CIA and outside agencies engaged in research and development including miscellaneous inspection, surveillance and technical direction services. As offices other than OPC were engaged in R&D activities (notably the Communications Division, OSO, and the Operational Aids Division, OSO), the need was expressed for an R&D Staff at CIA level. It was concluded:

a. A small R&D Staff should be continued in effect in OPC, in OAD, and in the Communications Division of OSO for the evaluation and coordination

of R&D requirements of the Operating Divisions;  
for the determination of functional characteristics  
inherent in such requirements; and for the initiation  
of action to satisfy them.

b. An R&D Staff should be established at the  
CIA level to provide for the general supervision and  
control of Agency-wide R&D activities within CIA.

Action was later taken in June 1951 to combine the  
Operational Aids Division of OSO and the Research and Develop-  
ment element of OPC into the Operational Aids Division under  
the Deputy Director, Plans. 114/ The new combined organization  
was given the title, "Material Assistance and Development Office,  
MADO." 100/ Later, the designation Technical Services Staff (TSS)  
replaced MADO.

#### L. COMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS

The increasing need to define policies and procedures for  
various communications functions resulted in the issue of a series  
of Communications Regulations. This requirement was based not  
only on good management considerations, but also on the necessity  
to provide for uniformity in communications techniques throughout  
the Agency, as the Communications Division served all CIA elements.  
This was particularly true in the case of OPC and its extensive  
overseas operations.

It was the practice in communications matters of joint concern to OSO and OPC for each Office to issue its own series of regulations. These were almost word-for-word-alike and, in retrospect, the practice may be cited as an example of unnecessary duplication of administrative effort.

The new regulations, which started to appear in 1950, sometimes updated and superseded earlier instructions (e.g., S. O. Procedure Guides) or formalized miscellaneous memoranda. Such earlier issuances in most cases had been made without coordination between OSO and OPC. The new regulation series had the merit of joint development and complete coordination, normally through the mechanics of the Joint OSO/OPC Communications Board.

One area requiring special attention was the procurement and issuance of agent radio equipment. An untenable situation existed for the Communications Division, as it had to be equally responsive to both OSO and OPC, but no guidelines as to priorities of procurement or issuance existed. There was inevitable duplication in requisitions and confusion as to issuance of equipment in the field. Unnecessary competition between OSO and OPC personnel for existing stocks was the result. Duplication of stocks also resulted, and sometimes equipment would sit unused for long periods unavailable for other use and accomplishing nothing except possibly providing satisfaction and comfort to the Office having

possession. This inefficient situation was eventually resolved by assignment to the Joint OSO/OPC Communications Board of the responsibility for establishing stock levels of agent radio equipments and for assigning priorities to projects involving issuance of agent radio equipment. This policy was initially formalized about June 1950 as S. O. Directive [ ] which was subsequently replaced by OSO Regulation [ ] (Appendix 2-N). The comparable OPC Regulation was No. [ ] of 6 July 1950.

A second area requiring clarification of policy concerned the provision of staff communications for OSO and OPC. The subject of equal facilities to support the staff cryptographic need of both OSO and OPC was presented to the Joint OSO/OPC Communications Board by the Chief, Communications Division, with proposals for appropriate regulation. 115/ The question requiring resolution was whether or not the Communications Division could provide privacy of communications for each Office at all field stations where permanently assigned representatives from both Offices were established [ ] No problems existed at stations where the volume of traffic warranted assignment of a full time Communications Technician, who established a CIA signal center which performed all cryptographic functions for both offices. A problem did exist at stations where traffic volume did not justify a full time Communications

Technician. At these stations, cryptographic responsibilities were performed by intelligence personnel who were designated "Communicators." Dependent on the size of the station, the Communicator might be the OSO station chief, or in most cases, his secretary. If OPC established a representative [redacted]

[redacted] at a station of this type, actual privacy of communications was not afforded, as an employee of the other office did the encrypting and decrypting; furthermore, it was possible for the Communicator to be unduly burdened by serving as code clerk for both OSO and OPC. It was, however, decided by the Board that the Communicator at stations not having a full time Communications Technician would, in fact, serve both offices including encryption and decryption. The final agreement reached between OSO and OPC is reflected in OSO Field Regulation [redacted] of 1 April 1951 (Appendix 2-G). The comparable OPC Field Regulation was [redacted] of 30 April 1951.

A third major definition of policy and procedure concerned the administration and operation of field communications installations and the relationship of Communications Division field personnel to other CIA field personnel. This was set forth in OSO Regulation [redacted] of 1 May 1951, (Appendix 2-O). This Regulation defined the categories of overseas communications activities and installations and delineated responsibility for the administrative,

25X1 technical, security, and policy control functions of those communications activities. OPC Regulation  of 27 August 1951 covered this same subject.

There were numerous other communications regulations issued in the 1950-1951 period. Subjects of special interest were the following:

a. Basic Cable Procedures 116/

This Regulation was for the guidance of OSO and OPC personnel in the preparation and handling of cables and established a standard procedure for signal centers. The instructions had been approved by the Joint OSO/OPC Communications Board, and changes in procedures were subject to the recommendation of the Board.

b. Assignment of Communications Personnel to Clandestine Operations

This Regulation established policy relative to the availability and assignment of Communications personnel to operations of a clandestine nature where such personnel would be in jeopardy of apprehension and interrogation. (Appendix 2-P).

c. Cryptographic Clearances 117/

This Regulation established procedures for issuing cryptographic clearances and designated

the Communications Division as the control office for all crypto clearances.

d. Inter-Station Communications

This regulation prescribed procedures for controlling contact between field stations and between personnel of field stations by whatever means including cable. (Appendix 2-Q).



## APPENDIX 2-A

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ACOMMUNICATIONS CHIEFS

18 September 1947 - 1 July 1951

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18 September 1947 - 18 May 1949

18 May 1949 - 7 June 1949

7 June 1949 - 22 August 1949

22 August 1949 - 7 September 1949

7 September 1949 - 10 September 1951

DEPUTY CHIEFS, COMMUNICATIONS

18 September 1947 - 1 July 1951

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18 September 1947 - November 1947

November 1947 - December 1948

January 1949 - 7 June 1949

7 June 1949 - October 1950  
(Includes 22 August - 7 September 1949)

October 1950 - September 1951

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## APPENDIX 2-C

13 March 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Report on Communications - Central  
Intelligence Agency

1. In conformity with your request, I have made a study of the communications of the Central Intelligence Agency for the purpose of determining:

(a) The place that this activity should be given in over-all organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(b) The duties that the organization now has and whether these duties should be expanded in scope (particularly with respect to such items as research and development).

2. As a result of this study, it is recommended:

(a) That the Division of Communications be given the title of Office of Communications in order that its head may have the necessary prestige to act on a co-equal status with officers charged with similar duties in the Navy, Air Force and Army, and other Government departments.

(b) That the Office of Communications be retained under the Deputy Director (Plans).

(c) That the Office of Communications be given a co-equal status with that of the Office of Special Operations, Office of Policy Coordination, and Office of Operations.

(d) That the head of the Office of Communications be given the title of Assistant Director for Communications.

(e) That the responsibilities of the Office of Communications, particularly with respect to research and development and policy liaison, be enlarged in scope so as to correspond in general with that of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army (See Enclosure No. 2 for details).

3. The reasons supporting these recommendations  
are included in Enclosure No. 1.

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Enclosures

Enclosure No. 1

1. The following are the governing considerations on which the recommendations contained in the paper to which this is an enclosure were based:

A. The present and expanding importance of communications for the Central Intelligence Agency (eventually resulting in a world-wide communications system). This consideration dictates that the individual responsible for the Communications be given such a place that he will have the prestige to deal on an equal status with the representatives of other governmental agencies in connection with:

(1) Priorities for:

(a) Channel (frequency) assignments for international communications purposes.

(b) Equipment research, procurement and production.

(c) Technical personnel

(2) Representation at International Telecommunications Conferences.

B. In recommending that the Office of Communications be retained under the Deputy Director (Plans), rather than being set up as a separate office directly under the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or assigned under the Deputy Director (Administration), the following considerations governed:

(1) The operational and administrative details of the Office of Communications should be so placed as not to render it necessary for the Director of Central Intelligence to be encumbered with such matters.

(2) Since the operating offices of the Agency for which the Deputy Director (Plans) is responsible are so dependent upon communications for the successful prosecution of their missions, it seems essential that this activity be placed under his control. The practicability of placing the Office of Communications

under the Deputy Director (Administration) was given most serious study, but considered undesirable because of the controlling necessity for operational rather than administrative control.

It is realized that in the Army the communications section is set up under an administrative agency, such as the Director of Logistics. However, an analysis of conditions indicates that the volume of research and development, procurement and distribution carried on by the Signal Corps for the entire Army and for the Air Force and Navy dictated that logistics control should have priority in contradistinction to operational control. In the Central Intelligence Agency operational requirements, particularly at this stage of the development of the Agency, are of primary importance rather than the supply requirements.

(3) For similar reasons the research and development activities connected with communications and electronics warfare have been included in the Office of Communications under the Deputy Director (Plans). The assigning of this responsibility to the Office of Communications is directly parallel to the assignment of such responsibilities to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army as an operational agency having to do with all matters affecting communications and the related electronics. These activities, of course, will be carried out in close cooperative relationship with the "Office of Scientific Intelligence" and "Office of Current Intelligence."

(4) In recommending that the Office of Communications be given co-equal status with the Office of Special Operations, the Office of Policy Coordination, and the Office of Operations under the Deputy Director (Plans) the following considerations governed:

(a) The above stated considerations with respect to raising the prestige of the Office of Communications.

(b) The fact that Communications serve the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole (and on a world-wide basis).

(c) The fact that arrangements now contemplated will adequately meet the requirements of the covert activities of the Office of Special Operations and the Office of Policy Coordination in a satisfactory manner without the necessity for subordinating the Office of Communications to either of these offices.

(5) The desirability of the Office of Communications being able to deal directly with other offices of the Central Intelligence Agency that it serves and other departments of the Government without having to go through too many intermediaries, particularly ones whose scope is relatively limited, is also a reason for raising the status of the Office of Communications to equality with that of the other offices in the Deputy Director (Plans).

Enclosure No. 2

**SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES -  
OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS**

1. It is recommended that the scope of the duties of the Office of Communications be enlarged as hereafter indicated.

2. The Assistant Director, Office of Communications, be authorized to represent with or without membership, as may be appropriate, the Central Intelligence Agency on communications and electronics matters before the following agencies:

- The Defense Production Agency
- The National Security Resources Board
- The Munitions Board
- The National Science Foundation
- The Research and Development Board, Department of Defense
- The Telecommunications Coordinating Committee
- The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee
- The State Department (Office of Operating Facilities and Technical Division)
- The International Telecommunications Conferences
- Civil and Military Communications Research, Development and Manufacturing Industries and Organizations
- The Armed Forces Security Agency
- Others as Appropriate

3. It is further recommended that the Office of Communications retain and/or be given responsibility for research and development (working in close coordination with the Office of Scientific Intelligence) in the communications and electronics field, particularly with respect to:

(a) Its own communications services and possible hostile counter-measures with respect thereto.

(b) The communications facilities and agencies of foreign governments.



(c) Advisory responsibility in connection with communications intelligence (in close cooperation with the Office of Current Intelligence), particularly with respect to the scope of the field covered and the adequacy of the existing means. Also research and development in the field of communications intelligence and communications security.


4. It is further recommended that the Office of Communications be authorized to confer directly with all other Central Intelligence Agency offices on matters directly connected with its mission, policy matters to be submitted to the Deputy Director (Plans) for approval before action is taken therein.

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APPENDIX 2-D


DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

Extracts from CIA Regulation



APPENDIX 2-D

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
Office of Communications



**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

**A S S I S T A N T D I R E C T O R F O R C O M M U N I C A T I O N S**

**I. MISSION**

The Assistant Director for Communications is charged with advising the Director of Central Intelligence, through the Deputy Director (Plans), on matters of communications and electronics policy; intelligence matters related to foreign communications and electronics systems; all other communications and electronics matters which have a bearing upon the security of the United States under the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency as set forth under its various charters; and providing the communications support necessary to the accomplishment of the various missions of the Central Intelligence Agency.

**II. FUNCTIONS**

In order to properly advise the Director and to provide the Central Intelligence Agency with reliable, secure and rapid electrical communications facilities for the transmission and reception of intelligence and for the control of its activities throughout the world, the Assistant Director for Communications shall be responsible for:

- A. Continuing exploration and evaluation of facts from all unknown sources, including liaison, relative to the consummation of his mission.
- B. Formulation and implementation of policies and programs which will make available to the Agency adequate telecommunications facilities conceived and operated under the most modern and efficient techniques available.
- C. Supervision and regulation of communications practices of the Agency under concepts and policies designed to safeguard these practices with adequate security standards.
- D. Formulation and implementation of policies and programs embracing research into and development of communications techniques, facilities, and specialized electronic equipment especially adapted to the needs of the Agency.
- E. Liaison with other Government agencies on communications and electronics matters, and for participation in and provision of technical support for Agency negotiations with officials of foreign Governments concerning communications matters.
- F. Degree of intra-Agency liaison essential to the proper coordination and planning for communications support of Agency projects.
- G. Formulation and continual review of Communications War Mobilization Plans for the Agency and the preparation of Communications Annexes to overall Agency mobilization as required.

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

H. Determination of requirements for equipment and personnel and other logistics support for communications activities of the Agency.

I. Conduct of highly specialized technical training, both elementary and advanced, for all communications personnel of the Agency, and the constant revision of communications training methods to keep pace with the rapid advance in the art.

APPENDIX 2-E

11 January 1949

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

Pursuant to memorandum dated 29 December 1948, signed by Captain Walter C. Ford, U.S.N., Executive Director, the following procedures will be followed by the Services Office and Communications Division, OSO, in handling signal property.

1. Accountable Officer and Accountability Records:

Accountability records will be established and will be maintained in the Storage and Issue Section, Supply Division, Services Office. It is understood Communications Division, OSO, will establish a memorandum record of stock on hand and will post to this record from requisitions as they are received. However, a copy of all debit and credit vouchers posted to the records of the accountable officer will be forwarded to Communications Division, OSO, for information.

2. Signal Equipment, Catalogue, and Nomenclature:

The Services Office, in cooperation with the Engineering Section, Communications Division, OSO, will review all existing signal equipment on hand and establish complete and accurate nomenclature of all items. A signal equipment catalogue carrying the correct nomenclature will be prepared. The Engineering Section will furnish the complete nomenclature required and a stock catalogue numbering system as item numbers will be mutually agreed upon. The signal equipment, catalogue will be issued and distributed by Communications Division, OSO. No catalogues will be distributed by the Services Office except within that office as required. The catalogue will not contain lists of covert or semi-covert equipment and it is understood Communications Division, OSO, will prepare and distribute such a list as they deem necessary.

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3. Stock Items - Stock Levels:

It is the responsibility of the Communications Division, OSO, to designate those items which they desire to be stocked, giving complete nomenclature and establishing maximum and minimum quantities for all items to be carried in stock. The addition and/or elimination of items to be carried in stock will be on the recommendation or approval of the Communications Division, OSO. The recommendations of Communications Division, OSO, in this regard will be made by memorandum to the Services Officer, CIA.

4. Requisitioning:

Communications Division, OSO, will initiate all requisitions for communications supplies and equipment required by overseas activities of OSO and by the Communications Division, USA. Requisitions for stock items will be forwarded directly to the Storage and Issue Section, Rosslyn, Virginia, and requisitions for purchase from vouchered funds will be forwarded to the Chief, Supply Division, Services Office. Requisitions for supplies or equipment to be procured from unvouchered funds will be forwarded to the Services Officer, CIA, with such approvals as are required by special funds regulations. Technical specifications for items to be procured under contract and those for developmental contracts will be prepared by Communications Division, OSO, and submitted together with appropriate requisition. Requisitions for signal supplies or equipment submitted by CIA activities other than OSO, received by the Supply Division to be issued either from stock or to be procured from open market or contract purchase, will be forwarded to the Chief, Communications Division, OSO, for coordination and approval. The same procedure will be followed by the Deputy Services Officer, Covert Branch, upon the receipt of requisitions from covert activities other than OSO. Requisitions for supplies or equipment for the replenishment of signal stock items will be prepared by the Accountable Officer, approved by the Chief, Storage and Issue Section, and will indicate

stock item number, nomenclature, quantity to be ordered, maximum and minimum quantities as established by the Communications Division, OSO, quantity on order, and monthly rate of consumption for each item to be replenished. Such requisitions will be forwarded to the Chief, Communications Division, OSO, Attention: Supply Officer, Communications Division, for approval. Requisitions which are approved will be forwarded to the Chief, Supply Division, Covert Branch, Services Office for procurement action. In any case where the Supply Officer, Communications Division, desires any changes to be made on the items requisitioned, he will forward his recommendations to the Services Officer, CIA, by a memorandum, together with the requisition concerned. Requisitions for items from stock required by Communications Division, OSO, Washington or vicinity, will be prepared by the Supply Officer, Communications Division, once each day and delivery will be made by the Storage and Issue Section on the following day. Requests for issuance of supplies and equipment required for an unforeseen emergency will be made on an informal basis, subject to the receipt of a confirming requisition. In these instances, temporary memorandum receipts will be obtained.

5. Receiving and Inspection:

Services Office will be responsible for the receiving of all signal equipment, and representatives of the Inspection and Testing Section, Communications Division, OSO, will be responsible for technical inspection of signal equipment. Services office representatives will not forward receiving copies of purchase orders or other document to the Budget Office until the signature of the Communications Division Inspector has been obtained on the Storage and Issue file copy of the procurement document. Inspection and testing will be made at the location at which the property is to be stored. Supplies or equipment found by the Inspector not meeting specifications, or damaged in shipment will be made the subject of a written memorandum by the Inspector to the Chief, Storage and Issue Section, indicating in sufficient detail the extent of failure to meet specifications and/or damage.



6. Inspection - Cargo Shipments:

Signal supplies and equipment will be inspected and tested by representatives of the Inspection and Testing Section, Communications Division, OSO, prior to packing or crating, and the Inspector will by appropriate means indicate those items which have been inspected and/or tested and will approve for shipment. The Storage and Issue Section will not make shipment of any items which have not been inspected and tested prior to shipment. Representatives of the Inspection and Testing Section, OSO, will supervise and approve the method of packing and actual packing of all technical equipment of a fragile nature, and will indicate by appropriate means those items in each shipment which were supervised as to packing and were approved. Responsibility for adequacy of packing will be mutual.

7. Substitution - Back Order:

The Storage and Issue Section will not make any substitutions of items requisitioned. Where an item is not in stock, the accountable officer of the Signal Supplies Unit, Storage and Issue Section will, by telephone, notify the Supply Officer, Communications Division, that the item or items requisitioned are depleted and request new requisition for new items where substitutions can be made. In addition, the accountable officer Signal Supplies Unit, will forward "out-of-stock memorandum" to the Supply Officer, Communications Division, OSO, and will indicate thereon those items and quantities of such items which cannot be filled from stock. Carbon copies of "out-of-stock memorandum" will remain on file in the Storage and Issue Section. The "out-of-stock memorandum" will always be used in these instances and will serve as a confirmation of telephone notice as indicated above.

8. Surplus Equipment and Supplies:

No signal supplies or equipment will be declared surplus by the Storage and Issue Section, Supply Division, without the prior written approval of the Supply Officer, Communications Division, OSO.

9. Priorities:

In order to facilitate and expedite procurement, inspection, packing, crating, and shipment of signal equipment and supplies, the following priority system is established and will govern all procurement, warehousing, and shipping activities of Services Office with respect to such shipments:

- a. AA Priority - This priority will be applied to all shipments in which procurement and shipments must be accomplished within a period of 30 days or less. If the period of time is less, the Supply Officer, Communications Division, OSO, will indicate on all requisitions, in addition to the priority, the deadline date and place from which shipment is to be made.
- b. A Priority - This priority will apply to those shipments on which procurement and shipment must be completed within a period of 60 days.
- c. B Priority - This priority will govern those shipments which must be made within a period of 120 days.

On other shipments of a routine nature, on which there is no urgency or deadline, no priority will be used, although procurement and shipment will be made at the earliest possible date.

In assigning priority, the Supply Officer, Communications Division, OSO, will, in addition to indicating the priority on all requisitions applying to the cargo and request for cargo shipment, also indicate the date

on which shipment will be made, the location if necessary, and will coordinate with the Transportation Division, Covert Branch, the date of availability of shipping space. In the event a shipment is cancelled, the Services Office will be notified by memorandum of the cancellation which will indicate disposition of equipment originally procured for the shipment.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Chief, Communications Division, OSO

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Services Officer

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Deputy Services Officer

\_\_\_\_\_  
Services Officer

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APPENDIX 2-J

24 November 1947

MEMORANDUM:

TO : CAS

FROM : COFS

SUBJECT: Requirements and Procedures for Operations Support

SES has been activated to coordinate all matters of equipment and technical operations support essential to the work of the Foreign Branches in the field. Its activation has permitted an assessment of the operations support functions that will be required for future field activities.

A survey of the facilities and resources of Communications, C&D, and TSD has shown that there is now no provision for numerous specialized support functions that will become increasingly essential to future field operations -- both in the preparation of equipment for field and in the availability of expert technicians to assist field personnel in the details of installation or application. In addition, several changes in supply procedure are necessary for SES to function properly as the control point for Operations on all matters of operational equipment.

1. Operations Support

The following is a tabulation of required operations support functions, and their present status:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Division Responsible</u>
a. <u>Communications</u>	
Electrical	Communications
Ciphers	Communications
Non-electrical	C&D
b. <u>Surveillance and Observation</u>	
Electrical	Communications: Few facilities available to camouflage equipment for clandestine field use.

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c. Operational Weapons (Cont.)

Installations

No facilities for experimentation or training; adequate test area required. Old OSS equipment in storage should be sorted and usable items salvaged.

At present operations support functions are divided on the basis of electrical and non-electrical equipment. Communications Division handles all electrical and electronic matters; C&D has responsibility for all non-electrical. Communications has, in addition to its long-range inter-station responsibilities, a cipher section and a developments laboratory. The work of the Division in the field is directed by an Operations Section which is also prepared to control the supply of technicians and specialized electrical equipment to meet field operation specifications for clandestine radio circuits or surveillance operations.

C&D is equipped to carry out its document reproduction activities and related research and photographic work. It also has a secret writing section. However, the only other operations support functions for which it is now equipped are in the line of minor camouflage work or certain development projects, both done through contracts with outside agencies or private firms.

Neither Communications nor C&D have provision to make expert technical personnel available to go to the field on short notice for specific equipment problems.

It would be of great advantage to have parallel organizational structures for Communications and C&D. Close cooperation and interchange of facilities between the two Divisions are essential since many support functions are closely inter-related: thus a major sur-

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Parallel organizational structures would also facilitate a major Operations requirement, the development and direction of a corps of expert technicians available to go to the field as needed and skilled in as many support functions, both electrical and non-electrical, as possible. In addition, the task of coordination of support functions with the field work of the Foreign Branches by Operations, that is, through SES, will be made more direct and effective.

For electrical matters, it appears that the present organization of Communications Division is in a good position to meet its share of operations support requirements. The various non-electrical functions not at present provided for, however, call for an enlargement of the resources of C&D Division. In fact, it appears particularly that a major review of C&D organization and functions is indicated. The establishment of a C&D Operations Section, similar to that in Communications Division, should be considered.

As it is the responsibility of CAS to provide the full scope of necessary functions, and the adequate and secure facilities they require, it is requested that a program be prepared to meet the following Operations requirements:

(1) Establishment of Facilities for:

(a) Planning of all problems of surveillance and observation, both positive and counter, both electrical and non-electrical, including selection and preparation of proper equipment, based on critical data supplied by SES; procedures for pooling the resources of C&D and Communications where problems entail the work of both Divisions, through the creation of parallel organization structures for the two Divisions.

(b) Centralization of control of all photographic supplies and equipment; stockpiling; testing prior to delivery to field, supervision of issue to assure proper equipment for specifications; control to assure presence of all needed accessories at point of use.



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(iii) Available to field test, in the U. S., pilot models of new equipment or research and development, or check equipment for TSD prior to shipment to the field.

(iv) Responsible for maintenance and use of Test Area (see below).

(v) Assignments for field or training duties to be cleared by Operations through SES according to operational priorities.

(vi) While in Washington to work integrally with Communications and C&D Divisions, under the immediate direction of the respective Operations Sections; while in the field to be under the control of the respective Foreign Branch.

(vii) Approximately 12 technicians will be required, both new men recruited from the outside according to standards and procedures of Communications and C&D, and including certain experienced personnel at present with Communications, TRS or other staffs. The 3-man COPS-2 project group would serve as a suitable nucleus.

(b) Additional C&D facilities, particularly the camouflage functions (see (1) (e) above) to support the work of the expert field technicians.

(3) Establishment of a Test Area for the work of the expert technicians. A private house in the near vicinity of Washington is recommended, to be used for special experimentation with equipment, perfection of techniques in its use, and secure training for selected agent or operations personnel. Specifications for the Test Area should be prepared in conjunction with Communications and C&D.

## 2. Changes in Procedures

### a. Inventory of Special Equipment

SES is responsible for the control of the use of all special equipment in field operational activities. "Special Equipment" includes materiel relevant to the operational support functions listed above, and, specifically, all items included on the SES Inventory of Specialized Equipment and Operational Aids.

The first edition of the Inventory, I/1, is scheduled for completion shortly. Classified TOP SECRET, it will be shown only to Foreign Branch chiefs or their chief operations officers, to inform them of the extent and variety of equipment available and the progress of research and development. OFEO will determine the extent of distribution of the Inventory. Revisions of I/1 will be prepared periodically by SES.

The Inventory lists type of equipment available and the quantity on hand. Information to compile these figures will be supplied periodically by Communications, C&D and TSD, according to a procedure to be developed. Based on these figures, specific procurement objectives on individual items will be compiled by SES in line with requirements formulated through DOPP.

### b. Stockpiling of Equipment

The procurement objectives based on the Inventory will prepare for the establishment of stockpiles of special equipment. Thus far there has been no centralized OSO program of equipment stockpiling. Such a program has several advantages:


(1) It will assure the immediate availability of items when needed, particularly of items otherwise difficult to procure on short notice.

(2) It will serve to protect the security of sensitive items, both to protect classification and to prevent unauthorized use by other agencies.

The items themselves should be kept by the unit most relevant to their use:

(1) Electrical and electronic equipment:  
radios, parts, recorders, supplies, electrical  
surveillance devices

..... Communications



(3) Standard items of equipment for issue  
on approved requisition, purchasable on the open  
domestic market or stocked in CIA supply; items  
not subject to special handling for security or  
policy purposes

..... TSD

(These items may be either stocked directly or  
maintained in CIA supply, earmarked for OSO.)

c. Supplies Requested from the Field

Requests for equipment from the field (pouch or  
cable) are at present generally routed to TSD with an infor-  
mation copy to the Foreign Branch concerned. This obliges  
TSD to undertake the full task of coordination instead of  
purely its basic function of supply and preparation for  
delivery. It also places a security burden on TSD to pro-  
tect pseudonyms and cover addresses on pouch correspondence.  
More significant, however, is the fact that directing the  
action to another division (C&D or Communications) would in  
numerous instances in the past have produced more rapid and  
effective results. The following procedure is recommended:

(1) Requests from the field should be routed  
to the appropriate Foreign Branch for action and  
approval.

(2) If approved, all requests covering special  
equipment should be passed to SES. Based on the  
data from the Foreign Branch concerned, SES will

formulate appropriate specifications for the division (C&D, Communications, or TSD) best able to fulfill the requirement, and will follow through to assure prompt delivery.

(3) Similarly, all requests covering normal items of supply not special equipment should be passed directly to TSD.

(4) All barter items will continue to be treated according to Operational Bulletin [ ] and [ ]

(5) In case of doubt as to category of equipment, requests should be passed to OPSO.

(6) If TSD is unable to obtain equipment requested of it in a reasonable period of time due to unavailability of equipment, SIS should be notified to ascertain if alternate equipment more readily available could not effectively be substituted to fill the request.

It is requested that a program to meet these requirements be prepared for early implementation.



APPENDIX 2-K

22 June 1948

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S. O. PROCEDURE GUIDE  (Revised)

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

1. The Special Equipment Staff designated in S. O. Directive No. 18 is the staff advisor on special equipment and techniques pertaining thereto, and is the channel to Administration & Services Group (CAS) to schedule the activity of Communications (CCD), Cover & Documentation (CDD), and Transportation & Supply (TSD) Divisions on operational equipment problems. As such, it is responsible for:

- a. Coordinating the use of technical devices and operational aids by the Foreign Branches.
- b. Determining future requirements for technical devices and operational aids.
- c. Ascertaining the effectiveness and suitability of equipment in use on field operations.
- d. Preparing for more highly specialized activities in the future under a long-range program of research and development.

2. Definitions:

- a. Special Equipment in general covers the technical devices and operational aids used in espionage and counterespionage operations or in immediate support thereof.
- b. Controlled Special Equipment refers to items designated by SES, in consultation with technical divisions of CAS, which (1) are covered by a security classification, or (2) require special techniques or camouflage. Specific clearance must be obtained from SES prior to the use of such items in operations (See paragraph 5 below).
- c. "Open" Equipment refers to all items of special equipment other than Controlled Equipment.
- d. Standard Equipment comprises all items of supply (except special equipment) under the responsibility of TSD, for which procedures have been promulgated and which are not here considered.

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3. The Foreign Branches will instruct the field that requests for special equipment must include full information on the problem which the equipment is to meet or the purpose for which it is to be used. Supply procedures have been revised accordingly:

a. All requests for supplies or equipment from the field by pouch or cable will be routed to the responsible Foreign Branch for action.

b. If it approves, the Foreign Branch will clear all requests for items of special equipment, whether Controlled or "Open," with SES.

c. SES will coordinate considerations of policy, relative priority, and security with all concerned and will forward the operational requirement to the technical divisions, under an SES Reference Number, which will constitute the code designation for the equipment problem. Any subsequent changes in operational plans will be cleared through SES by the Foreign Branch.

d. When the technical divisions have determined the specific items of equipment, they will send an itemized list to TSD for the preparation of necessary requisition forms, for the assignment of a cargo number, and for the records of TSD as to the equipment issued to the project, station, or area concerned. TSD will coordinate the procurement of all required equipment.

e. SES will keep informed of progress by the technical divisions and TSD, and will supply necessary follow-up.

4. SES will ascertain the use to which special equipment has been put in the field, and its effectiveness and shortcomings, for the information and guidance of the technical divisions.

5. Controlled Equipment will be used only for the specific operation or purpose for which released. SES will, through contact with Foreign Branches, keep advised of the disposition of each item or component. Controlled Equipment issued for one operation will not be used for any other operation or purpose without specific clearance.

6. Personnel in the field should be encouraged to send in any ideas for special equipment that would be of operational value, also notices of any novel equipment in use by other agencies. Such data will be routed to SES for forwarding to the technical division concerned.

25X1 7. S. O. Procedure Guide [ ] dated 26 January 1948,  
25X1 and [ ] are rescinded.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS:

25X1 [ ]  
Executive Secretary

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